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 VI 
Abstract (English) 
 
The following thesis deals with the theoretical functionality and the practical design of 
the European Emissions Trading System. The theoretical concept of environmental 
trading systems was invented by John H. Dales in 1968. It is usually judged very 
positively in economic literature, but it also requires some preconditions like low 
transaction costs that complicate the implementation process. During its first period, 
the European Emission Trading System, established in 2005, faced a variety of 
serious troubles. The decentralised approach to let member states decide about the 
number of allocated certificates as well as about the allocation formulas resulted in 
an extensive over-allocation of emission permits and a sharp price drop down to a 
few cents per CO2 certificate. Windfall profits endangered the credibility of the 
system. The threat of carbon leakage, on the other hand, resulted in a cautious 
handling of severe regulations. The EU ETS is the first trading system of its size and 
internationality. Therefore, initial troubles are not surprising. The trading system and 
the price development have stabilised during the second trading period. Planned 
alterations for the third trading period, which starts in 2013, give further reasons for 
optimism that the EU ETS can finally develop its advantage of cost-efficiency and 
become a powerful tool of the European climate policy.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VII 
Abstract (Deutsch) 
 
Die folgende Diplomarbeit behandelt das theoretische Design und die praktische 
Ausgestaltung des EU Emissionshandels. Das theoretische Konzept handelbarer 
Umweltlizenzen wurde schon 1968 von John H. Dales entwickelt. In der 
ökonomischen Literatur wird es überwiegend positiv bewertet. Allerdings wird der 
Implementierungsprozess durch wichtige Voraussetzungen, beispielsweise niedrige 
Transaktionskosten, kompliziert. Während der ersten Handelsperiode kam es zu 
einer Reihe ernster Probleme. Der dezentralisierte Ansatz, die Mitgliedsstaaten 
selbst über die Anzahl der bereitgestellten Zertifikate und die Allokationsformeln 
entscheiden zu lassen führte zu einer erheblichen Überallokation und zu einem 
scharfen Kursverfall. Hohe Gewinne energieintensiver Unternehmen gefährdeten die 
Glaubwürdigkeit des Systems, andererseits hatte die Gefahr von 
Wettbewerbsnachteilen einen vorsichtigen Umgang mit strengen Regulierungen zur 
Folge. Das EU Emissionshandelssystem ist das erste Handelssystem mit 
Umweltzertifikaten dieser Größe und Internationalität, einige Anlaufschwierigkeiten 
sind deshalb nicht überraschend. Während der zweiten Handelsperiode konnte das 
Handelssystem stabilisiert werden, die Preisentwicklung verläuft seitdem relativ 
konstant. Die geplanten Änderungen für die dritte Handelsperiode ab 2013 geben 
Grund für weiteren Optimismus. Das EU Emissionshandelssystem könnte nun 
endlich seine potenzielle Stärke der Kosteneffizienz ausspielen und zu einem 
mächtigen Werkzeug der europäischen Klimapolitik werden. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1968, John H. Dales developed a theoretical concept of a tradable certificates 
system to efficiently internalise external effects and account for environmental goods 
in economic theory. Even though his ideas were received positively in economic 
literature, his concept was hardly used in practical politics for a long time. Finally in 
2005, due to the emission reduction and limitation commitments of industrialised 
nations under to the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union established an emissions 
trading system for greenhouse gases that is meant to be a role model for worldwide 
emissions trading in the future. In my diploma thesis, I connect the economic theory 
of the tradable permits solution to the practical design and functionality of the 
European Emissions Trading System, discuss advantages and disadvantages of the 
licence solution and point out possible improvements so that the trading system can 
be more successful in the future.  
 
As an introduction to the topic, chapter 2 briefly discusses the greenhouse effect and 
the phenomenon of global warming. Although the global climate is much too complex 
to have absolute clarity about causes and consequences, leading scientists believe 
that human activity is the major cause for the increase in the mean global 
temperature during the past decades. Furthermore, this chapter sketches the 
international negotiations on climate protection that resulted in the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2004.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the problem of accounting for environmental goods in economic 
theory and summarises the history of attempts to internalise negative external 
effects. The chapter illustrates the Pigou taxation, the Coase-Theorem, the standard-
price-approach and the Clarke solution. Finally, the chapter explains the basic 
principles of the tradable permits system developed by John H. Dales in 1968 that is 
the theoretical fundament of the emissions trading system in Europe. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the theoretical analysis of the tradable permits solution. It 
illustrates how supply and demand interact in an emissions market and shows the 
enormous benefit of economic efficiency of this policy instrument. This chapter also 
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discusses the ecological effectiveness and regulative compliance and demonstrates 
the importance of transaction costs.  
 
Chapter 5 explains the practical design and functionality of the European Emissions 
Trading System. It illustrates the basic principles of emissions trading in the first two 
trading periods and the climate strategy package and gives an outlook on the third 
trading period starting in 2013.  
 
Chapter 6 finally deals with current issues and challenges of the European Emissions 
Trading System and recommends possible improvements for future trading periods.  
 
Since the European Emissions Trading System is the first trading scheme of this 
size, it is understandable that some start up time is needed to design the framework 
properly. Nevertheless, for the European Union in order to maintain its global front-
running role in the area of climate protection, significant improvements of the trading 
system are crucial to establish this policy mechanism as a role model for future 
worldwide emissions trading. 
   
 
2. The phenomenon of global warming 
 
For centuries, environmental goods like water and air were considered to be common 
goods, meaning that the utilisation of these goods by one market participant would 
not affect other participants. Since industrialisation and increasing environmental 
pollution, this perception became less and less true. Today, it is the challenge of 
environmental economics to assign an economic value to environmental goods and 
to develop approaches for the efficient internalisation of environmental pollution. 
 
Global warming, more precisely the rise of the mean global temperature, is one of the 
most important and controversial environmental problems of our time. Although the 
global climate is a very complex process, most scientists believe that human 
behaviour, especially the burning of fossil fuels, is the major reason for this climatic 
transformation. This realisation is the starting point for climate protection 
negotiations, for the reduction and limitation commitments according to the Kyoto 
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Protocol and, finally, for the establishment of the European Emissions Trading 
System. Therefore, we will start our analysis by briefly discussing the phenomenon of 
global warming and its possible consequences.  
 
 
2.1. Scientific explanation of the greenhouse effect 
 
The greenhouse effect, discovered by Joseph Fourier in 1824, means the increase of 
the global temperature because of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It can be 
divided into the natural and the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. According to the 
majority of scientists, the anthropogenic (human-caused) greenhouse effect is the 
most important reason for global climate change.  
 
 
2.1.1. The natural greenhouse effect 
 
The term “climate” is defined as the statistically adjusted condition of the earth’s 
atmosphere over several decades (Schenk, 2005, p.3). The earth’s atmosphere 
functions similarly to the glass roof of a greenhouse. Short-waved solar radiation 
passes unhindered through the earth’s atmosphere. In the course of the reflection by 
the earth it becomes long-waved. A mixture of greenhouse gases absorbs radiation 
within the thermal infrared range. Therefore, only a part of the radiation arrives back 
in space, the other part warms up the earth and its atmosphere. This procedure is 
called the natural greenhouse effect (shown graphically in figure 2.11).  
 
Although the greenhouse gases make up only about 1% of the atmosphere, they play 
a vital role in the earth’s climate system (Stowell, 2005, p.3). The procedure leads to 
a heating of the earth’s surface until a condition of equilibrium is reached. At present 
the mean global temperature is 15°C. Without any atmosphere the mean global 
temperature would be approximately -18°C (-20°C), 33°C lower than actually. 
Therefore, without the greenhouse effect human existence would not be possible 
(Schenk, 2005, p.3).  
 
                                                 
1 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/multimedia/photos/greenhouse_effect, downloaded on May 25, 
2010 
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Figure 2.1: The natural greenhouse effect  
 
 
Climatic effective atmospheric gases are, inter alia, CO2 (carbon dioxide), H2O (water 
vapour), O3 (ozone), CH4 (methane), and N2O (nitrous oxide). These gases are 
contained in the atmosphere also without human activities and, therefore, 
responsible for the natural greenhouse effect. Any change in the composition of 
these gases in the atmosphere leads to a modification of the transmissibility of the 
earth’s heat radiation. The impact of these gases on the greenhouse effect depends 
on their atmospheric concentration, on different molecular characteristics and on the 
retention time in the atmosphere (Lucht, 2005, p.1). The global warming potential 
shows the impact of the emission of a specific greenhouse gas on global warming, 
compared to the same quantity of CO2. It is summarised for the six major greenhouse 
gases in figure 2.2, based on Stowell, 2005, p.5.  
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 Global Warming PotentialGreenhouse gas
23,900 CO2 equivalentsSF6Sulphur Hexafluoride
6,500-9,200 CO2 equivalentsPFCsPerfluorocarbons
100-12,000 CO2 equivalentsHFCsHydrofluorocarbons
310 CO2 equivalentsN2ONitrous Oxide
21 CO2 equivalentsCH4Methane
1 CO2 equivalentCO2Carbon Dioxide
 
 
Figure 2.2: Global warming potential of the six major greenhouse gases 
 
 
2.1.2. The anthropogenic greenhouse effect 
 
Since industrialisation human economic activity goes hand in hand with the 
continuously increasing consumption of resources. Therefore, to an increasing 
degree also climatic relevant gases are laid off into the atmosphere. In the course of 
this process also synthetic greenhouse gases like CFCs (chlorofluorocarbon) 
emerge. Burning of fossil energy sources, industrial processes, modified use of land, 
and extensive forest clearance lead to an amplification of the natural greenhouse 
effect. This part of the greenhouse effect that can be traced back to human activity is 
called the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. Scientists estimate that around two 
thirds of the greenhouse gases that emerge because of human activity are due to the 
production and utilisation of energy (Schenk, 2005, p.4-5). CO2 evolves through the 
burning of fossil energy sources. It is only partly stored in the vegetation, in humus, 
and in the sea. Although it is the least effective greenhouse gas per unit emitted (see 
figure 2.2), due to large emission levels and a long lifespan in the atmosphere, 
carbon dioxide is the largest single contributor to the greenhouse effect (Springer, 
2002, p.12).  
 
 
2.1.3. Consequences of global warming and the problem of scientific proof 
 
Although a majority of scientists regard a causal connection between the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect and global warming as given, a serious registration 
of faults is very hard because of the complexity of the ecological system. Thus, 
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controversial scientific discussions about the degree and possible impacts of the 
climatic change take place. The most important evidence of global warming is the 
increase of the mean global temperature by 0.6°C since the beginning of the 
systematic temperature measurement and record in the year 1861 (Lucht, 2005, p.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Temperature increase in the Northern Hemisphere 
 
 
Figure 2.3, extracted from the third IPPC Assessment report, shows the temperature 
increase in the Northern Hemisphere over the last 1,000 years. Climatic causal 
interactions are very complex. Besides the concentration of greenhouse gases, other 
factors of influence are controversial in their mode of operation, for example 
fluctuations of the intensity of solar radiation or volcanic activities. These parameters 
further complicate a clear verification of anthropogenic causes of global warming. 
However, in the light of looming global menaces, global risk management strategies 
that go beyond the waiting for definite proof seem necessary. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) is a scientific body that 
periodically reviews the climate’s situation and publishes its results in Assessment 
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Reports. It was founded in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 
and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) to provide governments and 
decision-makers with a clear scientific view on the development of the world’s 
climate. Up to now the IPPC has published 4 Assessment Reports; the Fifth 
Assessment Report is currently under progress and will be finalised in 20142. In 2007 
the organisation, together with the former US Vice President Al Gore, was honoured 
with the Nobel Peace Prize. 
 
In the Fourth IPPC Assessment Report, published in 2007, scientific fundamentals of 
the climate change are explained, likely implications discussed and mitigation 
strategies recommended. In the last 100 years (1906 to 2005), warming has caused 
about a 0.74°C increase in global average temperature. Furthermore, eleven of the 
last twelve years (1995 - 2006) rank among the 12 warmest years in the instrumental 
record of global surface temperature since 1850. The report emphasises human 
responsibility for the climatic change. With a likelihood of over 90%, the major reason 
for the temperature increase are human emissions of carbon dioxide, followed by 
further greenhouse gases and various other factors. Figure 2.4, extracted from the 
fourth IPPC Assessment Report, shows the major radiative forcing components. It 
clearly depicts the influence of greenhouse gases on the current temperature rise.  
 
The report lists a series of aftermaths of the temperature and climate change, inter 
alia, a global average sea level rise, melting glaciers, losses of ice sheets, and an 
augmentation of extreme weather occurrences, including droughts, heavy 
precipitation, heat waves, and tropical cyclones. In the future a further temperature 
increase is expected. Different scenarios have been developed to forecast the 
quantity of the warming. They rely on variable assumptions like demographic 
development and economic growth. In the best-case scenario, the temperature rise 
until the decade 2090 – 2100 is calculated to be 1.8°C (with a likely range of 1.1 to 
2.9°C). The most disadvantageous case estimates an increase of 4.0°C (2.4 – 
6.4°C). Consequently, the expected sea level rise lies somewhere between 18-38 
and 26-59 centimetres. Because many natural processes react very lethargically, 
scientists estimate that even if all CO2 emissions were stopped immediately, the 
                                                 
2 The economist William D. Nordhaus, professor at Yale University, reviewed the IPCC’s activities in his book 
„Economics and policy issues in climate change“ and addresses specific economic questions regarding climate 
change policy. 
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earth’s temperature as well as the sea level would continue to rise for centuries (Stix, 
2007, p.13).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Radiative forcing components 
 
 
Regarding future implications of climate change, water availability is projected to 
increase at high latitudes and in some wet tropical areas, but decrease in some dry 
regions at mid-latitudes and in the dry tropics. The adaptability of ecological systems 
could be overstrained by increased occurrences of floods and droughts. This is likely 
to have negative impacts on the biodiversity as well as on food production. 
Furthermore, millions of people will be affected by the sea level rise, especially in the 
mega-deltas of Asia and Africa. Since developing countries tend to have more limited 
adaptive capacities, they are especially vulnerable. Hence, ironically, the adverse 
impacts of the temperature change first hit those countries not responsible for the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect in the first place (Weirig, 2005, p.8). 
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2.2. Political arrangements for climate protection 
 
The rise of the mean global temperature, the realisation that human behaviour is 
probably the main reason for this climatic change, and the urgency of this problem 
create a need for quick global political arrangements. Even so, it was not until the 
Kyoto negotiations in 1997 that a majority of countries agreed on emission limitation 
and reduction obligations. 
 
 
2.2.1. International negotiations on emission reductions 
 
During the mid 1980s, climate change slowly became a topic in the international 
debate. In June 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED, the Earth Summit) took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. By 
then it was the greatest international conference and delegates of nearly all 
governments of the world as well as many non-governmental organisations 
participated in the negotiations. During this convention many multilateral 
environmental agreements were made, among them the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The convention had the objective to 
obviate any dangerous anthropogenic interference with the earth’s climate system. 
The Precautionary Principle, defined in the convention, says that specific actions for 
climatic protection must be taken even in the absence of final scientific proof. 
Greenhouse gas emissions shall be abated back to the level of 1990 in industrialised 
nations. To reach this commonly defined goal, the convention stipulates additional 
protocols or other judicial agreements that contain more specific climate protection 
commitments. The central idea is the principle of mutual but diverse responsibilities, 
meaning that the industrialized nations, responsible for the climate change in the first 
place, have to take the lead in climate protection. The treaty does not contain binding 
commitments but it had great impact in clearing the way for further negotiations. 
 
The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994. One year later the First Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-1) met in Berlin, Germany. In the course of this 
meeting, the participating nations agreed on the Berlin Mandate. An ad hoc group 
was instituted that should develop a protocol containing specific and binding targets 
 10 
for emission reduction in industrialised nations as well as a time limit for their 
realisation. The negotiating parties also agreed on the implementation of a pilot 
phase for Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), a flexible instrument of emissions 
trading. In the forefront of the second conference (COP-2) in Geneva, Switzerland, 
the task force had already held three preparatory meetings. After a complicated 
election process, the delegates agreed on the Geneva Ministerial Declaration. The 
conclusions of the Second IPPC Assessment Report, finished in 1995, showed for 
the first time showed a scientific connection between anthropogenic emitted 
greenhouse gases and the climate changing process. It became the scientific basis 
for further processes in the international climate protection policy. Furthermore, the 
upcoming elaboration of a legally binding regulation of the reduction of greenhouse 
gases was underlined. In the following month many concepts and components of a 
climate protection protocol were discussed at various meetings. The European Union 
took a frontrunner position in proposing ambitious reduction targets. The Umbrella 
Group3, on the other hand, was especially interested in maximal flexibility but shied 
away from the presentation of specific reduction targets. Furthermore asymmetries 
between the industrialised nations and developing countries seriously complicated 
the negotiation process (Dzenan, 2008, p.40). Hence, it was not until the final 
conference of the negotiation cycle in Kyoto, Japan, that a commonly accepted result 
was achieved. 
 
 
2.2.2. The Kyoto Protocol and beyond 
 
In the course of the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) in December 1997 in 
Kyoto, the main features of the preliminary protocol, developed by the task force of 
the Berlin Mandate, were negotiated. In the end a consensus concerning specific 
reduction targets of all industrialised nations was reached. However, many other 
critical matters remained ambiguous and were postponed to later meetings.   
 
 
                                                 
3 The Umbrella Group, also called JUSSCANNZ, is an alliance of industrialised non-members of the European 
Union, namely Japan, USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. 
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The Kyoto Protocol divides the world’s nations into two groups, the Annex-B-
Countries4 and all other nations (Non-Annex-B-Countries). The Annex-B-Countries 
are obligated to jointly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5% compared to 
the level of 1990 in the time period 2008 – 2012. Annex A of the protocol specifies six 
greenhouse gases5 that are covered in this agreement. The individual countries have 
very diverse reduction targets that mostly depend on their economic development 
level. The European Union, for example, has agreed to jointly reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by 8%, and the United States has to cut their emissions by 7%6. 
Australia is allowed to increase its emissions by 8%, while Russia agreed to keep its 
emissions constant.  
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Figure 2.5: Emission limitation and reduction commitments as percentages of the base years or periods7 
 
 
According to article 4 of the protocol, the European Union decided to redistribute their 
emission reduction targets under the condition that the common reduction quantity 
remained the same. Hence, the Burden Sharing Agreement was developed in 1998. 
Precondition for the protocol to enter into force was the signature of at least 55 
                                                 
4 EU15, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Monaco and the 
European countries in transformation.  
5 Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
6 The USA initially signed the Protocol but did not ratify it. Therefore, the USA is not committed to any binding 
greenhouse gas reductions.  
7 The commitments are defined in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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nations responsible for at least 55% of all greenhouse gases worldwide in the year 
1990. 
 
The negotiation results immediately met with severe and diverse criticism. While 
environmental activists were disappointed by the humble reduction targets that could 
not possibly solve the threat of climatic change, economists feared high 
implementation costs of the protocol.  
 
After the Kyoto conference, a process of continued negotiations started to improve 
the protocol and to close its last gaps, but the meetings were characterised by 
various challenges and controversial issues (Dzenan, 2008, p.76-80). In March 2001 
US President Bush announced that the United States would not ratify the protocol. 
While some speculated that this decision would mean the end of the protocol, it had 
the unintended effect to galvanise the remaining participants (Stowell, 2005, p.26). At 
the COP-7 in Marrakech, Morocco, in 2001, an agreement was passed (The 
Marrakech Accord) that specifies the exact assessment base for emissions and their 
reductions. After the US rejection, the Russian signature was crucial for the protocol 
to become effective, and in November 2004 Russia finally ratified the protocol. The 
Kyoto Protocol, therefore, entered into force on February 16, 2004 (Schenk, 2005, 
p.10).  
 
Since the scope of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012, a successive regime is 
absolutely essential by now. Great expectations were laid on the COP-15 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, that, according to the Bali roadmap (developed during the 
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali in December 2007), should create 
a successive binding regime, but negotiations failed spectacularly. The Copenhagen 
Accord only mentions the target to narrow global warming to less than 2°C compared 
to pre-industrial times, but no specific reduction targets were resolved. While most 
governmental representatives tried to find positive words, the international press as 
well as environmental organisations reacted disappointedly. In their first reaction, the 
German newspaper “Die Zeit” titled “Euthanasia for the world climate” and “The 
miserable end of a great hope”, the newspaper “Die Welt” (D), on the other hand, 
tried to be as optimistic as possible: “Copenhagen is no cause for pessimism”. The 
Times (UK) spoke of a “lukewarm climate change deal in Copenhagen”. The New 
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York Times (USA) wrote about “A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks” although US 
newspaper headlines were dominated by the current healthcare reform plans of 
President Barack Obama. Hopes now concentrate on COP-16 in Mexico City in 2010 
to agree on a successive document for the expiring Kyoto Protocol.  
 
 
2.2.3. Flexible instruments of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The Kyoto Protocol lays great emphasis on flexibility in order to hold down the costs 
and disruptions of emission control. Therefore, the protocol contains the basis for an 
international trading system by establishing three market-based mechanisms, namely 
International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The basic principle is that emission saving 
activities can be done where they are most cost efficient.  
 
International Emissions Trading, specified in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, means 
the trading of emission permits between Annex B countries. Trading is done by using 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), standardised quantity units measured in tonnes of 
CO2 equivalents. The Kyoto Protocol, therefore, allows countries to meet their 
reduction commitments by purchasing reductions beyond their own target. 
International Emissions Trading is possible only between Annex B countries without 
constraint as from 2008.  
 
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, commonly referred to as Joint Implementation, is a 
project-based mechanism that requires ex-post verification of emission reductions in 
order to generate credits. Countries with targets defined in Annex B of the Protocol, 
or companies in these countries, are able to enforce emission reduction projects in 
other Annex B countries. Credits can be earned by using Emission Reduction Units 
(ERUs). Transfer and Acquisition under International Emissions Trading and Joint 
Implementation are a zero-sum game within the overall Annex B target of minus 5% 
compared to 1990 levels in industrialised nations. JI projects are allowed as from 
2008. 
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The Clean Development Mechanism functions similarly to Joint Implementation, only 
projects have to take place in non-Annex-I-Countries. Therefore, the reduction credits 
generated under this programme are not part of the overall cap on emissions under 
the protocol. Crediting is done by using Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). They 
can be used backdated to the year 2000. Possible examples are the funding of 
regenerative energy sources, efficiency improvements in the generation of electricity, 
and energy consumption. It is the ambition of the Clean Development Mechanism not 
only to lower emissions but also to support poorer countries on their way to 
sustainable development.  
 
 
3. Environmental goods in the economic theory 
 
Environmental economics deals with the causes and solution possibilities of 
environmental problems. The upcoming chapter discusses the problem of assigning 
an economic value to environmental goods and shows the history of internalizing 
external effects, which leads to the invention of tradable environmental licenses. 
 
 
3.1. The economic value of environmental goods 
 
Welfare economics studies how the allocation of resources affects the economic 
welfare of a society (Mankiw, 2004, p.151). On the one hand, welfare economics tries 
to determine efficient allocation of resources (the allocation theory); on the other 
hand, its purpose is to find criteria to choose between different efficient allocations 
(Rudolph, 2005, p.32). Since Adam Smith published his famous “Wealth of nations” 
the dominant idea has been that common wealth is best achieved through 
decentralised coordination of individual economic plans through the invisible hand of 
the market (Rudolph, 2005, p.32). Self-interests contribute to the augmentation of 
common wealth. Unfortunately, in some situations individual rational actions do not 
lead to this desirable society-wide outcome. The most important reason for the 
divergence between individual and collective rationality is the appearance of external 
effects. Hence, the price of a good as a scarcity signal does not fulfil its coordination 
function and the allocation result becomes suboptimal.  
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In economic theory, economic goods contribute to the satisfaction of individuals’ 
needs directly or indirectly. Therefore, environmental goods are also economic 
goods. In traditional environmental economics, the natural environment has a 
function as consumption good, provider of resources, and pollution recipient. Further 
examination shows the ecological importance for climate regulation, diversity of 
species, the self-regulation ability of ecological systems, and many more (Marggraf, 
Streb, 1997, p.27). Environmental goods have an enormous relevance in the 
economic process. Only if scarcity of a good exists, the good is linked to an economic 
value, meaning that opportunity costs occur because of different possible 
applications. These opportunity costs are lost utilisation possibilities regarding the 
second-best alternative of a specific good. The scarcity of a good depends on the 
relationship between applications demanded and the supplied quantity. Thus, 
economic scarcity and economic value are relative terms. The supply of 
environmental goods is dependent on natural processes. On the other hand, 
especially in the course of industrialization, the demand for environmental goods has 
been characterised by extraordinary growth. This relative scarcity leads to an 
increase in the economic value of environmental goods.  
 
The cause of environmental problems is an imperfect realisation of human 
preferences. Any solution to these problems must base on institutional changes that 
alter human behaviour to make it more compatible with environmental protection 
(Mercuro, López, Preston, 1994, p.103).  
 
Environmental goods can be viewed as scarce economic goods just as any other 
market goods. The rational handling of scarce goods is to utilise them in the best 
possible (meaning efficient) manner. In economic theory, efficiency means that no 
further enhancement is possible, considering the scarcity of resources and the 
ultimate goal of maximising the satisfaction of individuals’ needs. Because efficiency 
is the best reachable situation, economically efficient situations are said to be optimal 
situations. For the efficient use of economic goods, the aggregated weighting of costs 
and benefits is necessary. The aggregated benefit of a good is its utilisation 
according to the chosen direction. The aggregated costs, on the other hand, equal 
the opportunity costs of a good. In economic theory, a good is used efficiently if the 
distance between the aggregated benefits and costs are maximised.  
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Nowadays, ecological resources are overstrained compared to an efficient utilisation. 
As measured by the increased demand of environmental goods, the supply is simply 
too low. The reason behind this problem is that environmental goods are 
characterised by attributes that obviate the trading of these goods on markets and, 
thus, distort the reflection of the scarcity on market prices. The coordination of 
economic activities with the help of market prices only leads to economically efficient 
situations if these prices are reflected correctly by the costs occurring during the 
utilisation of these goods. If this is not the case, external effects occur (Nowotny, 
1987, p.33-34). 
 
Figure 3.1 (Marggraf, Streb, 1997, p.33) shows the impact of negative external 
effects on the economic outcome. In situations without external effects, private 
marginal costs (pmc) and society-wide marginal costs (smc) coincide. If external 
effects appear, this is not the case. The fact that only private marginal costs are 
considered in economic decisions leads to an exorbitant supply of the economic 
good compared to the efficient quantity qeff.  
 
qqeff q1
pmc
Figure 3.1: The impact of negative external effects
0
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As we see, environmental pollution can be interpreted as the inefficient utilisation of 
scarce environmental goods. The reason that the pricing mechanism fails in these 
cases is due to two characteristics. Firstly, many individuals can jointly use 
environmental goods without rivalry. Secondly, it is often not possible to exclude 
individuals from utilisation. Typically, environmental goods are collective goods since 
they are jointly used by a great number of individuals. In general, the benefit of a 
single individual is smaller than the provision costs of an environmental good. 
Nevertheless, the supply of the ecological good is efficient if the cumulated benefits 
of all consumers exceed the costs of provision. The individual’s contribution is too 
small to generate a noteworthy improvement, which is why it is never rational for a 
single individual to contribute to the incoming costs. This dilemma leads to a situation 
in which every consumer hopes that other consumers provide for the supply so that 
utilisation becomes free of charge. This phenomenon is called the prisoners’ 
dilemma.  
 
Because environmental goods are not provided efficiently by the market, the need for 
governmental interference emerges. Political decision-makers, instead of the market, 
need to allocate ecological goods among competing applications. To do so, different 
eco-political instruments are available, ranging from environmental obligations over 
the ascertainment of taxes to the distribution of certificates. Assuming that political 
decision-makers act in the best interest of the communality, their target is to 
maximise the macroeconomic optimal situation. Hence, it is necessary to allocate 
environmental goods in an efficient way. For this purpose the state needs to know the 
aggregated costs and benefits according to the different possible applications. In 
other words, politicians are required to know the economic values of environmental 
goods. 
 
 
3.2. The history of internalising external effects 
 
Environmental goods are usually treated as common goods but, on the other hand, 
they are becoming more and more scarce because of environmental pollution (see 
chapter 3.1). This contradiction raises the question of how to deal with them in 
economic theory. The history of internalising external effects and accounting for 
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environmental pollution in economic theory started with the invention of the Pigou tax 
in 1920. In 1968, John H. Dales developed a system of tradable permits. This 
conception is now the theoretical foundation of the European Emissions Trading 
System.    
 
 
3.2.1. The Pigou taxation 
 
In 1920, Arthur Cecil Pigou8, a British economist, argued that all costs of economic 
activities have to be covered in the price system. Only if all costs are comprised in 
the allocation decision of economic agents do they reflect the scarcity of resources 
and, therefore, lead to an efficient allocation of goods. The Pigou tax attempts to 
internalise negative external effects through governmental interference, and to 
integrate them into the price system. In the social optimum, the rate of taxation on the 
originator must be equal to the external marginal costs (Rudolph, 2005, p.24). In 
other words, the causer of external effects has to be taxed so that the social and 
private marginal costs are equal at the macroeconomic optimal production quantity. 
Otherwise, the individual pursuit of self-interests (the invisible hand of the market) will 
not lead to the maximal welfare value of the society. 
 
In figure 3.2 (based on Fritsch, Wein, Ewers, 2003, p.122) the supply curve s 
represents the private marginal costs (pmc). Furthermore, additional external 
marginal costs (emc) occur. If the supplier considers all costs from the production 
process (pmc+emc), the intersection of the social marginal costs (smc) curve and the 
demand curve d shows the market equilibrium (Point A) that is the macroeconomic 
optimum. Without internalisation, negative external effects lead to the equilibrium B, a 
situation in which the realised quantity q1 is too large and the price p1 is too low. The 
analogy of private and social marginal costs aspired by Pigou can be realised by a 
proportional tax per quantity unit, discharged by the suppliers. The tax rate t must 
meet the social additional costs at the optimal quantity q2 (t=AC). In this case, the 
supply curve moves to s+t and the intersection with the demand curve corresponds 
to the macroeconomic optimum (q2,p2).  
                                                 
8 In 1908 Pigou succeeded his teacher, the famous English economist Alfred Marshall, as professor of political 
economy in Cambridge.  
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Figure 3.2: Pigou taxation
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Pigou shows a perfect solution in theory. Unfortunately, extensive information 
requirements are crucial for decision makers to calculate the optimal tax rate 
correctly. Whereas external additional costs are assumed as given in the model, they 
can only be approximated in reality. For example, many environmental damages 
occur after a considerable time lag. Furthermore, the number of pollution origins and 
claimants are usually very high. In many cases it is not possible to attribute external 
effects correctly to their causer. Moreover, the fixed tax rates only work for one 
specific constellation of supply and demand so that the governmental authority would 
permanently have to re-evaluate and adapt the taxes rates. These and other 
problems are a major barrier for the use of the Pigou taxation in praxis (Fritsch, Wein, 
Ewers, 2003, p.124-125).  
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3.2.2. Internalisation by negotiations (Coase-Theorem) 
 
The next noticeable step followed in 1960. Ronald Coase recognised the 
unambiguous assignment of property rights to be the key to an efficient 
internalisation of external effects (Rudolph, 2005, p.25). Property rights are devices 
of the society to regulate laws, conventions and customs (Jaeger, 1993, p.54). 
Operating rights always imply a governmental authority that enforces these rights. A 
right is only as secure as it is the duty of people to accept the regulations. Therefore, 
to internalise external effects, the state needs to create stable institutional basic 
conditions. This enables an efficient management of environmental resources as 
private goods.9  
 
The importance of property rights is also shown by the endowment effect. This 
hypothesis, developed by Richard Thaler in 1980, indicates that people value a good 
more, once their property right to it has been established. In other words, people put 
a higher value on objects they own compared to other objects.  
 
The assignment and design of individual property rights on resources have a direct 
impact on the economic achievement of a society because they determine the 
incentives for economic subjects to internalise external costs. When property rights 
are fully specified, they can be allocated efficiently through negotiation or trading, 
without the need for a superior authority. The resulting situation is independent of the 
initial allocation of property rights (Rudolph, 2005, p.25). Coase argues that the 
appearance of external effects is not only due to a physical causer but also to the 
existence of one or more persons concerned. Unlike Pigou he distinguishes between 
physical and economical responsibility and refers to the reciprocity of the externalities 
problem. In many cases it is not clear which party causes the external costs. The only 
clear fact is that external costs occur because of competing requirements of the 
same natural resource. This competition transforms the initially free environmental 
good into an economic good. But who has to pay for the utilisation depends on the 
effective legislation of property rights (Jaeger, 1993, p.39-40). 
 
                                                 
9 The economic problem of the absence of property rights was already described in the 18th century by David 
Hume in his book “A Treatise of Human Nature”, today commonly known as “the tragedy of the commons”. 
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In the absence of legal liability, the emitter is entitled to cause boundless social 
additional costs. He will only agree to decrease the damage against payment of 
some compensation.10 
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Figure 3.3: Coase-Theorem – Absence of legal liability
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The point of origin in our consideration is 0A in figure 3.3 (based on Fritsch, Wein, 
Ewers, 2003, p.135). The polluter and the claimant both have an incentive to attend 
negotiations about the extent of the damage. The claimant could increase his benefit 
by transferring some payment to the emitter to make him reduce his harmful 
behaviour. On the other hand, the polluter generates a benefit if this compensation 
exceeds his abatement costs. If the damage quantity is reduced to 0N, the area 
QBAN shows the damage reduction experienced by the claimant. Because this area 
exceeds the costs of abatement (PAN), a Pareto improvement with regard to the 
allocation is still possible. Negotiations continue till the difference between the 
                                                 
10 In his paper „The problem of Social Cost“, Coase used the example of a farmer and a cattle-raiser operating on 
neighbouring land to demonstrate his ideas figuratively. Ronald Coase was rewarded with the Nobel Price in 
Economics in 1991 for his contribution of discovery and clarification of transaction costs and property rights.  
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abatement costs and the pollution benefits equals zero. This situation is reached at 
the point 0E. 
 
Therefore, the claimant transfers an amount CE for every pollution unit to the emitter. 
This agreement is advantageous for each party. Compared to the initial situation 
(given by the pollution amount 0A), the emitter increases his benefit by the area ACF. 
This is calculated by subtracting the accumulated compensation (given by the area 
ECFA) from the abatement costs (ECA). The benefit of the claimant increases by the 
area CBF since he reaches benefits of the area ECBA but has to pay compensation 
costs, given by the area ECFA. So the agreement increases the macroeconomic 
benefits by the area CBA, the sum of the benefits of the emitter and the claimant. 
Figure 3.3 is just one of many possible solutions of how the welfare gain can be 
distributed among the involved parties. The concrete realization depends on 
negotiation skills and power.  
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In a situation with legal liability, shown in figure 3.4 (based on Fritsch, Wein, Ewers, 
2003, p.136), the generation of external costs is generally forbidden. However, 
potential emitters have the possibility to buy pollution rights. The claimant will only 
agree if the originated damage is at least compensated. Starting from a situation 
without environmental damage (point 00), there are incentives for negotiations till the 
marginal abatement costs equal the marginal damage. This point is reached at an 
emission quantity 0E. If the parties agree upon a payment of the extent of CE by the 
emitter, the benefit of the polluter increases by the area DGC while the claimant 
gains benefits given by the area 0DC. The macroeconomic gain of welfare adds to 
the area 0GC. 
 
As shown, both legislation regimes lead to negotiations that enable the parties to 
move towards common as well as individual profit maximisation step by step. Both 
situations finally result in a social and macroeconomic Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources. The arrangement of the initial distribution of property rights appears to be 
neutral according to the damage quantity, at least in theory. The macroeconomic 
optimum is reached through decentralised decisions without the need of a 
governmental authority. Of course, unlike the allocation result, the distribution of profit 
and income is a matter of the prevalent legislation system.  
 
How technological external effects can be internalised through private negotiations is 
a matter of a variety of factors. Inevitable preconditions are the existence of freedom 
of contract and the unambiguous allocation of property rights. For the practical use of 
the Coase-Theorem transaction costs have to be considered. In general, if the 
transaction costs are distributed disproportionally among negotiation partners, the 
one party that faces higher transaction costs is disadvantaged. One major 
determinant of transaction costs is the number of concerned persons. Generally, 
costs for organising a special interest group increase disproportionately with the 
number of involved participants (based on Fritsch, Wein, Ewers, 2003, p.138). 
Furthermore, the free rider problem tightens. One possible solution for this problem is 
that the participants assign their right for negotiation to a representative. These 
problems show that the internalisation through negotiations is only theoretically an 
appealing solution, in reality it is connected with serious problems. Thus, it is only a 
possibility in exceptional cases.  
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3.2.3. The standard-price-approach 
 
Neither the Pigou tax nor the Coase Theorem can be easily applied to practical 
politics. Thus, economists were still looking for applicable concepts to efficiently 
internalise negative external effects and for environmental policy-making. In the year 
1971, William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates developed the standard-price-
approach. Its purpose is to achieve a politically defined environmental standard (fixed 
target policy) with the lowest costs possible (Rudolph, 2005, p.25-26). Assessment 
base is the physical degree of damage or a factor that is closely associated. Thus, 
negative external effects are reduced efficiently and technical progress is stimulated 
that helps to avoid future damage. The general idea is that the government collects a 
fee for environmental utilisation. The economic player then chooses to pay the fee or 
to reduce the intensity of environmental contamination.  
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Figure 3.5: Standard-price-approach
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In figure 3.5 (based on Fritsch, Wein, Ewers, 2003, p.126) the tax rate exceeds the 
marginal abatement costs of all pollution units additional to the point 0S. The 
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optimum appears at point A (t=mac). Here, the tax rate and the marginal abatement 
costs are equal. At the tax rate t, the polluter produces damage of the degree 0S, 
and he has to pay a tax amount shown by the rectangle 0TAS. The increase of the 
tax rate from t to t1 leads to a reduction of the damage quantity to 0S1, whereas in the 
case of a decrease from t to t2, it is economically rational to avoid less damage. The 
optimal situation then moves to the quantity 0S2. This mechanism leads to an overall 
cost-efficient allocation of actions for emission avoidance. 
 
In summary taxation according to the standard-price-approach is a practical 
realisation of the Pigou solution. Unfortunately, in terms of accuracy the approach 
faces major problems. To correctly determine the appropriate tax rate, the 
governmental authority needs abatement cost functions of all emitters, which in 
reality can only be approached in the long term by trial and error. Alterations of the 
number of emitters, availability of new production technologies and price changes 
additionally decrease the accuracy of the standard-price-solution and create the need 
for adjustment over time.   
 
 
3.2.4. The Clarke solution 
 
In practice, the assumption of perfect information can hardly be applied at all. 
Therefore, the Pigou taxation and the Coase Theorem both lead to inefficient results 
regarding production quantities and welfare distribution. Using the Clarke taxation 
this deficit can be eliminated. 
 
Firstly, a neutral authority fixes the microeconomic production optimum. In figure 3.6 
(based on Jaeger, 1993, p.52) this quantity is given by q0. The emitter as well as the 
claimant have to announce how the pollution quantity shall be diminished compared 
to the uncorrected competition equilibrium. The idea behind this internalisation 
concept is that both parties have to discharge a Clarke-taxation. The emitter pays a 
tax rate tE which exactly equals the external marginal costs of the claimant. The 
affected party, as causer of the production reduction, also pays a tax tB that is equal 
to the marginal abatement costs of the emitter. None of the participating actors has 
any rational incentive to reveal their true preferences.   
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Figure 3.6: Clarke solution  
 
 
The emitter will advocate the production quantity where the tax amount for the last 
produced unit tE=emc(q) exactly equals the additional rent of production d(q)-pmc. 
This microeconomic production optimum is located where the emc and the d curve 
intersect and accounts for q1. If the emitter pretends an incorrect demand curve d’, 
his marginal tax rates exceed the marginal profit, shown by the distance E1’B’. In the 
case of d’’, the marginal benefit loss exceeds the marginal tax saving by E1’’B’’. The 
claimant also favours the production quantity q1 because at this amount the marginal 
taxation as compensation for production limitation tB(q1) exactly matches the external 
marginal costs burdening the emitter emc(q1). By pretending emc’(q), the marginal 
taxation would exceed these external costs by E’’1B’’. Therefore, also in the case of 
the claimant microeconomic and macroeconomic interests harmonise. The total tax 
revenues of the state add up to 
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The principle of double taxation developed by Clarke faces similar problems as the 
Pigou and Coase arrangements, but at least it solves the problem of strategy 
sensitivity. Of course, the tax collecting authority needs to know the demand curve as 
well as the curve of external marginal costs. Otherwise, the achieved intersection will 
not be a Pareto-optimal welfare and allocation result.   
 
 
3.2.5. The invention of tradable permits 
 
In the year 1968 the Canadian political economist John H. Dales developed a system 
of tradable emission permits. Like Coase he blamed the absence of property rights 
for the occurrence of external effects, like Baumol and Oates he constrained his 
approach to cost efficiency (Rudolph, 2005, 26-27). The internalisation of external 
effects using tradable permits can, therefore, be interpreted as a combined 
realisation of elements of the Coase-Theorem and the standard-price-approach 
(Fritsch, Wein, Ewers, 2003, p.139). In his model private property rights on public 
goods can be created by privatising theses goods through the definition of 
unambiguous exploitation rights and by making these rights accessible to the pricing 
mechanism. This is done by the creation of a market for emission licences.  
 
Generally, two different types of emission licence systems are possible (Perman, Ma, 
McGilvray, Common, 2003, p.223). In the cap-and-trade system (described in detail 
in the following chapters), the politically determined total quantity of emissions is 
segmented into a plurality of fractions and then allocated among potential emitters. 
Polluters then choose to use their licences themselves or to sell their permits on the 
licence market. This procedure avoids the need for regulation adjustments that are 
necessary in the standard-price-approach because the total quantity of emissions is 
directly determined by political decision-makers and not subjected to the market 
development. Another alternative is the emission reduction credit. Here, a business-
as-usual scenario is used to estimate a baseline profile of relevant emissions. By 
emitting less harmful substances than estimated, a company earns a corresponding 
amount of emission reduction credits. Each credit then works as a transferable 
emission permit (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, Common, 2003, p.228).  
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Tradable permit are usually judged very positively in economic literature, but they 
pose multiple practical questions and problems. Therefore, for a long time permits 
were hardly used in practical politics (Altmann, 1997, 137). 
 
 
4. Theoretical analysis of the licence solution 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.2.5, the tradable permits solution is usually judged very 
positively in economic literature. On the other hand, the practical establishment of an 
emissions trading system raises many delicate practical challenges. Chapter 4 
analyses the most important strengths and weaknesses of the certificates solution 
and discusses its theoretical functionality.  
 
 
4.1. Functionality of the tradable permits solution 
 
The commitment to maximal values for environmental pollution is a political process. 
After this decision, the certificates are allocated among potential emitters and a 
market for emission licenses emerges. In the upcoming chapters, the theoretical 
functionality of trading with emission permits is taken under scrutiny.  
 
 
4.1.1. The commitment to maximal values for regional environmental pollution  
 
The licence solution functions like a cap-and-trade system. The policy maker 
determines an acceptable upper limit of pollution for a specific environmental subject 
in a geographic area. This decision determines the total emission volume. Control 
variables can be either emission- or extraction data or indirect indicators like 
production or input values. The use of direct regulation requires sufficient knowledge 
about macroeconomic abatement- and consequential costs and regeneration 
functions of environmental resources. Moreover, for the execution of the indirect 
regulation system, aggregate production-, emission- and diffusion functions are 
needed. This leads to barely solvable problems of information provision (Jaeger, 
1993, p.328). Furthermore, considerable transaction- and administration costs 
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appear as an outcome of strong requests for supervision and control of the effectively 
executed emissions. 
 
Ideally, regional contamination and benefit standards are determined according to 
economic optimality criteria. This means that total economic costs are minimised. As 
figure 4.1 (based on Jaeger, 1993, p.330) shows, total emission costs (ec) are 
composed of aggregated abatement costs (erc) and aggregated consequential costs 
(ecc). The minimum of the total costs is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]eecceercMineec += !**  
 
The cost minimum is reached at the emission quantity e*. At this point the 
macroeconomic marginal emission reduction costs (merc) equal the macroeconomic 
external marginal consequential costs of emissions (mecc). The macroeconomic 
marginal abatement costs are calculated by aggregating all microeconomic marginal 
abatement costs.  
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Figure 4.1: Macroeconomic optimal emission standard for a specific region
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Economic optimisation is only possible in a world that is characterised by perfect 
information. In reality asymmetric information is provided, especially regarding 
regional consequential costs. The administrative authority has to approach the 
efficient marginal utilisation values through trial and error, which leads to uncertainty 
among involved actors. Another possibility is to agree upon a biologically maximally 
tolerable emission value and periodically deviate the marginal emission values for a 
given region. Of course, political decision-makers also consider other objectives than 
efficiency, including health and safety considerations, provision for equity, 
sustainability, and technical as well as political feasibility (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, 
Common, 2005, p.193). Because the political process might generate arbitrary 
results, this procedure can lead to suboptimal solutions (Jaeger, 1993, p.331).  
 
Initially, the mandate owner of the environmental good is a governmental authority or 
the state itself. The total emission quantity is then segmented into separate parts and 
certified as emission licences. In the next step, these licences are distributed among 
potential emitters. The ownership of a certificate entitles the occupant to the use of a 
certain pollution quantity during a given timely scope inside a local territory. After the 
distribution of the licences they can be assigned from one owner to another – a 
market for emission licences develops. The price and the allocation are determined 
endogenously by supply and demand so that the price shows the scarcity of the 
environmental resource. 
 
 
4.1.2. Supply of environmental certificates 
 
The government controls the macroeconomic supply of environmental permits as a 
monopolistic supplier. It can auction the licences on an environmental stock market 
or distribute them for a fixed price or even for free among established emitters.  
 
In the case of licence auctioning, a primary market is generated that determines a 
first price. The problem of auctioning is that a completely new legal situation is 
created. The right of continuance as well as all permissions that are assigned up to 
this date are not reliable anymore. Furthermore, financially strong corporations might 
try to displace smaller companies from the market (Altmann, 1997, p.138). 
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Another possibility is the allocation free of charge. The market then develops through 
licence assignments among polluters. This alternative is called the grandfathering 
method (Altmann, 1997, p.138). If permits are distributed cost-free, the criteria 
chosen for the allocation process have to be emissions generated in the past. 
Otherwise companies would have an incentive to pretend that their present 
emissions are exorbitantly high to receive huge certificate quantities.  
 
Free distribution of licences discriminates non-resident enterprises and tends to 
disadvantage corporations that already invested in environmental technology before 
the base period (“rewarding the laggards”). An easy way to attenuate this problem is 
to choose a base year dating back a longer time. Furthermore, the danger exists that 
new entrants are disadvantaged compared to already existing firms. This problem is 
usually confronted by setting aside contingents for new market entrants. Of course, 
this solution in turn endangers the environmental effectiveness.  
 
Because emission permits are certified and transferable, they are traded on the 
secondary market, irrespectively of the initial allocation method. On both markets, 
buyers can be either established and potential emitters, or any actors such as private 
persons or environmental protection organisations. In the latter case, there is the 
possibility that additional actors decrease the total supply and, therefore, lower the 
emission quantity in a given region.  
 
Time limitation on licence validities enables the governmental authority to control the 
reduction or increase of the total licence quantity after the expiry of a given period. In 
the case of unlimited permits, the government has the possibility to devaluate the 
certificates or to use open market operations to decrease the emission quantity.  
 
 
4.1.3. Demand of environmental licences 
 
Established as well as potential emitters in a certificate regime have the alternative to 
either continue or intensify their environmental utilisation by buying and executing an 
adequate number of usage permits, or to abridge their emissions. Emitters will 
choose their emission quantity so that their total costs, that consist of reduction costs 
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and the acquisition of certificates are minimised. For this predictable behaviour 
several assumption are necessary. Decision parameters like expectations about 
future economic and environmental developments must not be relevant. Furthermore, 
emitters have to possess adequate information and must not act strategically. In this 
situation emissions will be reduced so that the individual total marginal cost of 
emission reduction is equal to the certificate price, which can be interpreted as the 
marginal cost of the emission (Jaeger, 1993, p.335). Of course the assumptions 
listed above are far from realistic. 
  
The individual marginal cost functions for emission reduction can be interpreted as 
demand curves for emission benefits (Jaeger, 1993, p.335). The total demand in a 
region can be determined by horizontal aggregation of all individual demand curves. 
If the licence price increases because of a decline of total supply, certain demanders 
will reduce their emissions by reducing production or by substituting for cleaner 
resources, production processes or products. Furthermore, under dynamic conditions 
the demand curve for emission licences can alter its form or position, for example, 
because of an increasing number of emitters, product and process innovations or 
because of new environmental protection technology.  
 
 
4.1.4. The interaction of supply and demand in the case of certificate 
auctioning 
 
Let us consider a functioning certificate market. During the initial allocation a starting 
certificate price p is generated that balances total demand and total supply. In the 
ideal case, market clearing makes the marginal utilisation cost reductions equal the 
marginal costs of environmental utilisation, namely the permits’ market price. 
Through the market process, the certificate solution achieves the environmental 
target in an economically efficient way. In the market equilibrium the system leads to 
a microeconomic efficient allocation of environmental utilisation, minimising the 
macroeconomic emission avoidance costs.  
 
Another question is if the certificate solution leads to an economically optimal 
pollution quantity straightaway. This depends on whether the state authority is able to 
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achieve and politically enforce the economically cost-minimising emission standard. 
On this very unlikely assumption, the society would already reach a microeconomic 
as well as a macroeconomic equilibrium on the primary market, and, therefore, a 
society-wide Pareto-optimal environmental protection solution. 
 
In reality, the market is very unlikely to quiet permanently after the initial allocation. 
Various troubles lead to continuous market imbalances which require ongoing 
adjustment processes. Furthermore, on a non-regulated secondary market, the 
supply curve is not necessarily vertical and, therefore, not totally price inelastic 
anymore (Jaeger, 1993, p.340). The free market entrance of non-emitters enables 
other actors than the state to appear as buyers on the secondary market and to 
delete emission permits. Two possibilities are conceivable. Rationally acting non-
emitters will orient their behaviour towards the benefits that the acquisition and 
abandonment of environmental permits generate. Let us assume that the initial 
certificate allocation of the total emission licences quantity el1 generates a certificate 
price p1 in figure 4.2 (based on Jaeger, 1993, p.341).  
 
As long as the certificate price p1 is less than the marginal consequential costs of 
polluting activities mecc(e1) incentives for non-emitters remain to bear these 
consequential costs and to put utilisation licences out of service. This process 
continues until the macroeconomic optimal emission status e1 (=el1) is reached. The 
price per licence, therefore, increases to p1*. The macroeconomic adjustment 
process terminates when the last saved consequential costs equalise the certificate 
price. This means that under ideal conditions the supply curve on the secondary 
market is represented by the curve of marginal consequential costs. 
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Figure 4.2: The long-term price building process on the secondary market
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Unfortunately, the assumptions necessary for this results (non-emitters have to act 
rationally, all actors possess perfect information and no strategic behaviour and no 
non-economically justified budget constraints appear) (Jaeger, 1993, p.342) are very 
unrealistic. The less these requirements are met, the more the certificate supply 
curve and the curve of marginal consequential costs differ from each other and, 
therefore, the more considerably the realised degree of environmental utilisation 
differs from the economically desired cost-minimal standard.  
 
It is possible that a connection between different environmental utilisations appears. 
Harmful substances can be connected as complements or substitutes. In the first 
case, it is sufficient to introduce licences for only one kind of emission, in the latter 
case, the state authority has to include all substances in the permit solution. 
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4.1.5. The interaction of supply and demand in the case of a rationed 
certificates market 
 
Another possibility is to ration certificates and distribute them for a fixed tariff lower 
than the market price or even for free. The total quantity of environmental utilisation is 
restricted to a standard lower than the status quo. Certificates are allocated among 
the established actors proportional to the emission distribution at any time before the 
system change. The reallocation process is a result of the secondary market. 
Enterprises with relatively low abatement costs sell their certificates which are no 
longer required on the emission market. Corporations that face high abatement costs 
demand those permits. This process continues till the market is cleared and no actor 
can upgrade his situation anymore. In a well-functioning competitive market, the 
licence price is identical to the one generated initially from auctioning permits 
(Perman, Ma, McGilvray, Common, 2005, p.225). The trading process leads to a 
microeconomic Pareto-optimal result. In succession, the market functions the same 
way as in the auctioning case.  
 
The environmental authority also has the possibility to adopt the status quo standard 
and gradually reduce the cap on the secondary market. This can be done by using 
either devaluation- or open market operations.  
 
 
4.2. Theoretical device analysis 
 
The license solution is characterised by many great advantages, especially cost-
efficiency. Of course, this attribute is dependent on important preconditions like 
perfect information of all actors and low transaction and administration costs, which 
are discussed in the following chapter. Furthermore, the ecological effectiveness of 
the permits solution and the problem of regulative compliance are also analysed. 
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4.2.1. Economic efficiency of the tradable permits solution 
 
The greatest benefit of the tradable permits solution compared to other policy 
measures for environmental protection is cost-efficiency. The following example 
sketches a permits market and shows the difference compared to a regulative 
solution. In addition, this chapter explains the advantage of dynamic efficiency and 
discusses the relevance of transaction and administration costs.  
 
 
4.2.1.1. Example of a permits market 
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Figure 4.3: The price- and quantity building process on the primary market  
 
 
Figure 4.3 (based on Jaeger, 1993, p.337) shows a regional market with n emitters, 
two of which are illustrated in the figure. Without a tradable permits system it is 
unlikely that emitters will reduce their environmental damage. In this initial case the 
environmental burden equals 
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Let us assume that the environmental protection authority decides to reduce the 
environmental damage by exactly half, to e1. This is done by ordering every emitter to 
reduce his emission activity by 50%. In this directive regime the total macroeconomic 
emission reduction costs add up to: 
 
( ) ( )∑ 5,3,15,3,1 areaareas i   
 
The same environmental target can be reached through the implementation of a 
licence concept in an economically more efficient way. After the initial allocation, a 
certificate price p is generated. The emitters react diversely according to their 
microeconomic optimisation calculus. In figure 4.3, emitter I will reduce his pollutant 
activities only to e2I and buy the remaining necessary permits whereas emitter II is 
able to sell parts of his licences by reducing his emissions to e2II. In the market 
equilibrium a microeconomic efficient allocation of environmental utilisation is 
generated. The macroeconomic costs of emission avoidance are minimal and, 
therefore, smaller than using the directive regime.  
 
( ) ( )∑ = 5,3,16,3,2 areaareas i  
 
In addition, the expenditures of the emitters for the purchase of the emission 
certificates equal 
 
∑ = 22 ** elpelp i  
 
The total expenditures of the emitters are shown by the areas (0,3,6,7)i. The 
revenues of the state generated by the sale of the licences, account for p*el2, of 
course optional transaction- and administration costs have to be subtracted.  
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4.2.1.2. Theoretical background 
 
Efficient environmental policy is characterised by the attainment of a given quality 
target which is subject to minimal economic expenses (Rudolph, 2005, p.34). The 
allocation of actions to reach the quality target is efficient if the sum of all abatement 
costs of all emitters is minimal. In the permits solution case, emitters will choose an 
optimal emission quantity at which their marginal abatement costs equal the price of 
the certificates. Through microeconomic calculation also follows that the society-wide 
target achievement is cost-efficient. At a given cap emitters with high abatement 
costs buy more licences but avoid reducing their emissions. Emitters who face lower 
abatement costs demand less licences but they amplify their actions to avoid 
emissions. Therefore, reductions only take place at cost-optimal locations. Formally 
economic analysis says that the sum of all abatement costs of all emitters is minimal 
if, and only if, the marginal abatement costs of all emitters are equal. This conclusion 
is known as the least-cost theorem of pollution control (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, 
Common, 2005, p.204). Irrespectively of the initial allocation method, the licence 
solution achieves this adjustment of abatement costs of all emitters and, therefore, 
leads to a society-wide cost-minimal environmental protection (Rudolph, 2005, p.37).  
 
Competitive characteristics play a significant role concerning the problem-solving 
ability of licence solutions. Retention of licences to influence the market situation of 
competitors through market power leads to market distortions and, thereby, to 
efficiency losses. New emitters could be deterred from entering the market. However, 
facing heterogeneous markets, this strategy is hardly efficient. Furthermore, 
governmental supervision would solve the problem.  
 
In both, the environmental taxation and in the tradable permit solution, emitters try to 
minimise their costs. The major difference between these two alternatives is that in 
the first case the price for emissions is fixed centrally and the market determines the 
emission quantity whereas in the case of emission certificates the total quantity is 
fixed and the price development depends on the market mechanism. That is why the 
tradable permit solution is called a quantity solution while environmental taxes are 
said to be price solutions (Altmann, 1997, p.138). 
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The implementation of the certificate solution alters the income and wealth situation 
of the involved participants. Temporarily limited licences lead to a redistribution of 
disposable incomes while unlimited permits have an impact on the distribution of 
wealth. Furthermore, the initial allocation system alters distribution effects. In the 
case of auctioning permits, the emitters have to face both the costs for emission 
reductions from a possibly higher initial position to the permitted emission quantity as 
well as costs for buying the required permits on the auction market. In the case of 
cost-free initial allocation, on the other hand, this inclusion of leftover pollution costs 
omits. The charging of costs determines to which degree the licence solution 
matches the costs-by-cause principle (Rudolph, 2005, p.39). In the end, it is always 
the allocation impacts that decide about the ability of political enforcement. 
 
If the information conditions are good, the licence solution will more likely lead to a 
microeconomic and macroeconomic optimal and cost-efficient allocation result. In 
spite of this, the certificate solution is not totally independent of market dysfunctions. 
Repeated unheralded devaluations or open market interventions lead to uncertainty 
and complicate expectations and planning. There is also a danger that speculators 
buy environmental certificates to hoard them and sell them later for profit. 
Furthermore, mighty companies could run short licences to constrain new suppliers 
to enter the market. There are various actions, the environmental protection agency 
can undertake, to undermine these anticompetitive methods and facilitate the 
expectation creation and planning of the economic subjects. A first method is to 
restrict the validity of the certificates. At an early stage, the authority can also 
announce a graduate scheme that amplifies the transparency of the overall certificate 
supply. A possible reaction to anticompetitive strategies of market leaders is to 
enhance the certificate supply on a short notice (Jaeger, 1993, p.357). Of course, 
any kind of market regulation impairs the adjustment and allocation process 
considerably, which is reflected in macroeconomic suboptimal results. 
 
 
4.2.1.3. Dynamic efficiency 
 
In a certificate system, every actor aims independently at an individual solution by 
considering abatement- and certificate costs. Thus, instead of only minimising costs 
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given the actual technology conditions companies, face huge incentives to develop 
and implement new environmental protection techniques in the production and 
process area. This system leads to a decline of average and marginal abatement 
costs.  
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic incentives of a certificates solution  
 
 
As long as the certificate price stays at p0 in figure 4.4 (based on Jaeger, 1993, 
p.361), incentives are strong for invention and innovation. By reducing their emission 
quantity from eio to ei1, emitters save costs through reduction activities (illustrated by 
the shaded area) as well as through the acquisition of certificates (at first: p*(el0i-el1i). 
Even if other actors imitate the new technology, a sustainable advancement would 
remain. This process leads to a macroeconomic reduction of the demand of licences 
and, therefore, to a common price decline from p0 to p1. Realistically, this 
development makes the environmental protection agency permanently cut back the 
certificate supply which improves the ecological quality sustainably. The positive 
circular conjunction between economic growth, the advancement of environmental 
quality and technological innovation creates an extraordinarily dynamic efficiency of 
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the certificate solution. The incentives given by the licence solution make economic 
growth at constant or even decreasing environmental contamination plausible.     
 
Another major advantage is the possibility to administer certain parameters, like the 
initial quantity, the time limitation of permits, and the gradual utilisation cutback, 
flexibly. Therefore, fast and differentiated reactions on market and technology 
adjustment processes are possible.  
 
 
4.2.1.4. Transaction and administration costs 
 
Analysing the tradable permit solution, both, the initial assignment of licences from 
the state to enterprises and the transfer of licences among emitters, are considered 
transactions11. Market based transactions cause costs that can shift the supply and 
demand curves and therefore have an impact on the equilibrium. If the transaction 
costs are greater than the efficiency gains of a decentralised coordination of 
individual plans through the market, other coordinating mechanisms could generate 
cost advantages compared to the market. (Rudolph, 2005, p.53)  
 
Unlike the state, emitters have detailed knowledge about internal production 
processes, corporate singularities, local characteristics, and available human capital. 
Emitters, who are in possession of this specific knowledge, are able to decide on the 
best abatement strategy. Because an emitter has to face the consequences of his 
decisions himself, he will use his knowledge in an efficient way. This leads to an 
optimal usage of the knowledge potential (Rudolph, 2005, p.54-55).  
 
Transaction costs reduce the quantity of licences traded. The existence of transaction 
costs constrains the trading of licences and, therefore, obviates a society-wide 
efficient allocation of abatement actions. Transaction costs can be diminished 
through the installation of licence stock markets and the usage of brokers. 
Furthermore, increasing market activities and frequent transactions automatically 
                                                 
11 According to Rudolph, transactions are interactions of economic subjects to whom property rights are 
assigned. In general, the execution of transactions is not cost-free which influences the decision-making of 
economic subjects. 
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generate information that helps to diminish market uncertainty, lower transaction 
costs and, in turn, increase activity on the licence market.  
 
Administrative costs strongly depend on the concrete practical design but tend to be 
lower in the case of a licence solution than in the case of other environmental policies 
(Rudolph, 2005, p.40). Costs which are implemented in advance are low because 
market-oriented instruments avoid a complex single approval procedure. Only the 
total quantity of licences is given as a result of political determination. Ex post, the 
expenses of control and supervision are comparable to a requirement system.  
 
 
4.2.2. Ecological effectiveness of the licence system 
 
Ecological effectiveness measures the degree to which an environmental instrument 
is able to unerringly achieve the politically appointed quality target (Rudolph, 2005, 
p.43). Using pollution licences, the environmental burden can be actuated directly 
through the determination of a total emission quantity. The boundary of 
environmental exploration through the state as the ambassador of the society 
matches the justifiable claim of each member of the society for an acceptable 
environmental quality standard. What is more, the licence solution participates in the 
intergenerational equitableness. The boundary of the total quantity of emissions 
acknowledges the boundary of the ecological system.  
 
The compliance of environmental quality targets cannot be disturbed by the market 
process. The achievement of intentions is independent of the number of actors as 
well as of the demand elasticity (Jaeger, 1993, p.356). On the assumption of 
functioning licence markets, the entrance of new market participants is possible 
without environmental challenges. The burden on the environment does not change, 
only the price for licences increases. Therefore, the environmental contamination 
cannot legally exceed the fixed value. It is the responsibility of the state to set the 
environmental target and to supervise the compliance. Knowledge about abatement 
cost functions is not necessary.  
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The time period to reach the environmental target can be chosen freely, according to 
the economy and the urgency of the situation. An essential problem of the licence 
solution is the creation of “hot spots”. In separate regions specific contaminants could 
appear in concentration, leading to high local burden. Possible solutions are 
additional regional limiting values (back-stop regulation) or the creation of regional 
markets. This, in succession, can lead to a diminishing of market participants and, 
therefore, to thin markets (Rudolph, 2005, p.46). Another solution possibility is the 
differentiation of licences.  
 
The more information about consequential costs of environmental utilisation the 
agency has, the better is it able to aim the environmental quality standards. 
Unfortunately, data can be updated only with a considerable time lag; therefore 
interventions tend to lead to suboptimal results (Jaeger, 1993, p.358).  
 
Another central question is to what extent the licence solution meets the 
requirements of the precautionary principle. Environmental decisions should be 
swayed so that potential future environmental dangers are avoided a priori in order to 
protect the natural livelihood (Rudolph, 2005, p.47-47). This leads to an economic as 
well as an environmental advantage. The licence solution discharges a fundamental 
alteration of the valuation of the environment in the long term. Furthermore, 
corporations face a permanent incentive for innovation.  
 
 
4.2.3. Regulative compliance 
 
Concerning the regulative compliance, the certificate solution hardly gives cause for 
concern. Even so, in the case of the initial allocation by auctioning licences as well as 
regarding a cutback of utilisation rights later on, the question of a problematic 
reduction of vested rights in accordance with the rule of law remains. Factual 
utilisation rights of economic actors are undone by the realignment of property rights; 
individual pollution holdings are narrowed and redistributed. It is a violation of the 
principle of equity and good faith if legally warranted vested rights are affected 
without any legal background (Jaeger, 1993, p.353-354).  
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The administrative allocation also bears the risk of arbitrariness regarding the fixation 
of individual contingents. Furthermore, the unequal treatment of established 
corporations and newcomers is not only problematic from a legal but also from an 
economic perspective. A more philosophic point of criticism is the question of the 
ethical defensibleness of the commercialisation of the environment. By applying the 
certificate solution, the right on environmental exploitation is at least bounded. 
 
 
5. The European Emissions Trading System 
 
The European Emissions Trading System was established in 2005 to help the 
member states of the European Union to reach their reduction and limitation 
commitment. The upcoming chapter sketches the development of the EU ETS and 
explains its practical functionality in the first two trading periods as well as planned 
alterations for the third trading period.  
 
 
5.1. Development of the EU ETS 
 
The Kyoto Protocol obligates industrialised nations to jointly reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions by 5% compared to 1990 levels in the time period between 2008 and 
2012. As specified in Annex B of the protocol, the reduction targets vary among 
countries due to different national circumstances. The European Union took a front-
running position in the climate protection negotiations and finally agreed to jointly 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% compared to 1990. 
 
In the Burden Sharing Agreement of 1998, the member states of the European Union 
decided to make use of Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol (the “bubble concept”) and 
share the reduction target among the community12. These individual reduction 
obligations are shown in figure 5.113. The commitments are very unequal because 
                                                 
12 If the 8% target is collectively achieved, it does not matter if individual countries within the EU miss their 
particular targets. 
13 http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/kyoto-burden-sharing-targets-for-eu-15-countries, 
downloaded on June 11, 2010. 
 
 45 
the member states are in different stages of development, they range from -28% in 
Luxemburg to +27% in Portugal14.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Reduction targets under the Burden Sharing Agreement 
 
 
The new member states of the European Union are not covered by the 8% target and 
are therefore not part of the Burden Sharing Agreement but they have their own 
reduction objectives under the Kyoto Protocol15, shown in figure 5.216. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Reduction targets of the new member states 
 
                                                 
14 Germany has to cut the highest amount of emissions in absolute terms even though Luxembourg has the most 
ambitious target in relative terms. 
15 Malta and Cyprus have no emission reduction targets.  
16 http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/greenhouse-gas-emission-targets-of-new-eu-ember-states-
for-2008-2012-relative-to-base-year-emissions-under-the-kyoto-protocol-1, downloaded on June 11, 2010. 
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The European targets are very ambitious and so the realisation of the Kyoto 
commitment has imposed a serious problem. The European Commission estimated 
that by preceding the status quo, the Community would fail the 8% reduction target. 
Thus, the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) was launched in 2000. Six 
working groups developed a package of 40 cost-efficient measures and 
recommendations. The main outcome was the implementation of an European 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The European Commission estimated that 
emissions trading would bring cost advantages of about EUR 2.4 billion for the 
Community, the Kyoto target could consequently be reached with costs less than 
0.1% of GDP (Müller, 2008, p.21). Furthermore, the Commission expects 
improvements in energy efficiency and security, reduction of air pollution and health 
costs, and increased employment. In 2003, Directive 2003/87/EC was passed and 
the EU ETS entered into force on January 1, 2005 (Müller, 2008, p.14).   
 
 
5.2. Functionality of the EU ETS in the first and second trading period 
 
The EU ETS developed in multiple phases. The pilot phase ranged from 2005 to 
2007. Since the trading system is the first of this size, some start up time was needed 
to evaluate the functionality and correct certain weak points. The second phase 
corresponds with the obligation period of the Kyoto Protocol; it ranges from 2008 to 
2012. For the third trading period from 2013 to 2020, many alterations are planned 
that shall improve its economic efficiency and ecologic reliability (see chapter 5.3.2). 
 
 
5.2.1. Basic principles 
 
The EU ETS is a market based instrument to lower greenhouse gas emissions in the 
European Union in a cost-efficient way. It is designed as cap and trade program, 
which means that a total quantity of emissions is settled politically, and the market 
determines where emission reductions take place (see chapter 4). Whereas Kyoto 
only provides the possibility of emissions trading between countries on national level, 
the EU ETS also enables trading between single companies.  
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EU Allowances (EUAs) are recognised community-wide. They are based on the 
same unit of measurement as AAUs under the Kyoto Protocol. One allowance equals 
one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent17. Permits are site specific and non-transferable. 
 
The EU ETS is the major climate policy instrument of the European Union and 
currently the biggest emissions trading system worldwide. Initially, it comprised the 
15 EU member states, today it includes the EU 27 as well as Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. Countries that are joining the European Union are required to comply 
with the emissions trading directive. The EU ETS captures more than 10,000 
industrial facilities that are responsible for nearly 50% of CO2 emissions and for about 
40% of the overall greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union. The trading 
system covers CO2 emissions from large emitters in the power and heat generating 
industry and in selected energy intensive industrial sectors, accurately defined in 
Annex I of the directive18 (Weirig, 2005, p.11).  
 
In order to comply with the emissions trading directive, facility operators have to 
report their actual emissions to the responsible authority until April 30 of the 
subsequent year and deliver a corresponding amount of certificates. In the case of 
non-compliance, member states are obligated to inflict penalties. In the pilot phase, 
the directive stated that non-complying companies had to pay EU 40 per excessive 
tonne of CO2 equivalent, in the second period this amount has risen to EUR 100. The 
comparatively small punishment in the first trading period was due to the fact that this 
time period was considered a learning process for the administrative system as well 
as for the participating companies. In addition to the monetary penalties, installations 
must make up for the shortfall in allowances in the following compliance period.   
 
 
5.2.2. National Allocation Plans 
 
The allocation of certificates is carried out new in each trading period. Each member 
state is obligated to develop a National Allocation Plan (NAP) for the upcoming 
                                                 
17 Either one tonne of CO2 or a specific quantity of any other greenhouse gas defined in Annex 2 of the protocol 
with an equivalent warming potential.  
18 Combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, 
bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper.  
 48 
period before a specific key date. The NAPs define the total volume of traded 
emissions as well as the allocation among companies. Annex 3 of the emission 
trading directive determines 11 criteria that have to be considered when designing 
the plan19. Despite these criteria the member states have much freedom of design. 
The European Commission is responsible for monitoring the scheme and maintains 
the authority to veto NAPs.  
 
Generally, the initial distribution of certificates can be allocated according to three 
methods. Firstly, the benchmarking method is predicated on the state of technology. 
It has a great incentive for innovation but the allocation determination is very costly. 
Secondly, the grandfathering method allocates permits free of charge according to 
past emissions. It is very popular because of its easy operability. The third alternative 
is the auctioning of certificates. The theoretical difference between auctioning and 
allocating certificates free of charge is accurately described in chapter 4.1.2. In the 
pilot phase, at least 95% of the certificates had to be allocated for free, in the second 
period this number has declined to 90%.  
 
In the first and second trading period, all 27 member states allocated their allowances 
according to the grandfathering method. In some cases sectoral benchmarks or 
sector-specific growth factors were added. The base periods used in the allocation 
process covered one to ten years, in some countries facilities could exclude the year 
with the lowest emissions. Some countries also distinguished between process-
related emissions and energy related emissions (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, 
p.7). 
 
 
5.2.3. Emissions trading in praxis 
 
Each member state has to appoint a public authority that controls the compliance 
with the trading rules and instructions. The governmental body only approves the 
                                                 
19 First of all, the total quantity of traded certificates has to be compatible with the Kyoto target. The trading 
system should contribute as much as possible to the reduction target since emission reductions in sectors that are 
not covered by the EU ETS are likely to go hand in hand with higher costs. Furthermore, a member state must 
not allocate more certificates than necessary to cover the current or forecasted emissions in a specific sector. 
Unjustifiable preferential treatment has to be avoided in the allocation process, but member states should also 
account for unequal initial situations of facilities. 
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authorisation for greenhouse gas emissions if the company can verifiably monitor its 
emissions and report them to the authority. The reporting has to be done at any one 
time three months after the end of the calendar year. The reports are controlled and 
released by independent experts. If a report is not approved until March 31, the 
particular operator does not obtain any new certificates until a satisfactory report is 
presented.  
 
Emission certificates exist only electronically. Any allocation, occupancy, transfer or 
cancellation of certificates is recorded in a specific electronic commercial register. 
Any natural or juridical person within the EU may trade and hold an account within a 
national registry. Stock exchanges that trade EU Allowances are, inter alia, the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig, the European Climate Exchange 
(ECX) in Amsterdam, NordPool in Oslo, and PowerNext in Paris. 
 
 
5.2.4. Special forms of compliance 
 
Since 2005, member states can apply to the Commission to include (opt-in) 
installations or activities with thresholds lower than required in the directive. Since 
2008 member states can also apply to include additional activities and installations 
that are not listed in the directive as well as further greenhouse gases. The 
Commission has the right to deny these requests for expansion.  
 
In the first trading period, member states could also exclude (opt-out) certain 
installations from the EU ETS under the condition that these installations would 
realise their reduction requirements through other measures. Furthermore, the 
member state had to guarantee that there would not be any distortion of competition 
because of this exception. For opting-out installations, the approval of the 
Commission was also mandatory.  
 
Operators of a certain branch have the possibility to form pools for the purpose of 
participating in and complying with the EU ETS. The Commission has the capability 
to deny a member state’s request. The possibility of pooling will expire at the end of 
the second period.  
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In each case, certificates have to be applied in the period in which they are issued. 
Within specific periods, the trading system provides the opportunity to transfer 
unused permits to the next year. This is called emissions banking. An exemption was 
the interface between the first and the second period, when member states had to 
cancel and re-issue unused allowances. Starting with the second trading period, 
certificates can be taken along into subsequent periods.  
 
Installations also have the possibility to borrow allowances in order to meet their 
reduction targets. If an operator calls upon this alternative for the prior year, he either 
has to purchase additional permits or reduce more emissions than required. 
However, between periods, borrowing is not possible.  
 
Furthermore, as on regular stock markets, emission allowances can be traded via 
derivative activities, inter alia, Forwards, Futures, Options, and Swaps.  
 
 
5.2.5. The Linking Directive 
 
The Kyoto Protocol provides the opportunity to use flexible instruments in order to 
comply with the reduction target (see chapter 2.2.3). The Linking Directive 
2004/101/EC integrates credits earned by Joint Implementation (ERUs) and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CERs) within the EU ETS. These credits can be 
exchanged on a one to one basis with EUAs. Therefore, companies have the 
possibility to receive certificates through investments in international projects. CERs, 
generated by emission reduction projects in developing countries, can be officially 
used since 2005. ERUs, achieved through projects in other industrialised nations, are 
accepted since 2008. Member states must declare in their NAPs which percentage of 
their installations’ allowances may be converted. The Commission retains the 
possibility of rejection because the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are 
only meant to have supplementary character. In the first period, CERs and ERUs 
from land-use change and forestry projects were not eligible; in the second period 
credits are excluded that are generated from nuclear projects.  
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5.3. Beyond 2013 
 
The Kyoto Protocol expires in December 2012. Since the world’s countries have not 
agreed on any commitments beyond this period, the future of international climate 
protection is very unpredictable today (see chapter 2.2.2). Nevertheless, the 
European Union plans to further reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, continue and 
develop its emissions trading system and keep its leading position in international 
climate protection.  
 
 
5.3.1. The climate strategy package 
 
In 2007, the Commission made some proposals that were mainly approved by the 
European Council. Point of origin was the strategic target to limit the rise of the global 
temperature to 2° Celsius at most compared to pre-industrial times (Ziesing, 2009, 
p.109). Therefore, emissions are to be reduced by 60% to 80% compared to 1990 
levels. In January 2008, the Commission passed a comprehensive climate- and 
energy package that is meant to create binding targets for the EU member states for 
the year 2020. 
 
The package states that greenhouse gas emissions are to decrease by 20% 
compared to 1990 levels or by 30% if other industrialised countries also participate20. 
Therefore, energy productivity has to increase to such an extent that the adjusted 
energy consumption will be reduced by 20% in 2020. The portion of renewable 
energies has to increase to up to 20% of total energy consumption. Furthermore, the 
fraction of bio fuels has to rise to up to 10% compared to the total petroleum and 
diesel consumption (Ziesing, 2009, p.110). 
 
The Commission also proposed guidelines for the member states to guarantee the 
attainment of these targets. Sectors that participate in the EU ETS have to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions by 21% compared to 2005 (Ziesing, 2009, p.110). In 
addition there are various reduction targets in those sectors that do not participate in 
the trading system.  
                                                 
20 Of course, this scenario has become very unlikely after the unfruitful climate protection negotiations in 
Copenhagen in 2009. 
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In the light of the present pollution development, these targets imply remarkable 
efforts in the policy areas of energy and climate protection. Industrial representatives 
already fear competitive disadvantages caused by carbon leakage (see chapter 6.9). 
 
 
5.3.2. Future alterations in the EU ETS (the third trading period) 
 
In 2008 the European institutions passed an amendment of the emissions trading 
directive 2003/87/EC and, thus, agreed on the future of the EU ETS (Müller, 2009, 
p.35). Starting with 2013 the NAPs will be replaced by a common single cap. 
Because of the abandonment of the member states’ NAPs, environmental 
effectiveness and target achieving becomes better calculable and predictable. 
 
The future development of the total quantity of certificates is exactly stipulated in the 
directive. Starting in 2010, the average number of certificates allocated in the second 
trading period will be reduced by 1.74% annually (Müller, 2009, p.38). Therefore, the 
cap declines during the entire trading period.  
 
From 2013 on, the allocation method will differ between sectors. For electricity 
generation, there will be no cost-free allocation anymore, exempted are only some 
operators in Eastern European countries. Heat generation and industries that are not 
affected by relocations will face a slow transition towards higher amounts of 
auctioning. From 2013 on, 20% of the certificates allocated to these sectors will be 
auctioned, and until 2020 this portion will increase to up to 70%. Facilities in the 
energy intensive industry will receive certificates determined by benchmarks because 
of strong international competition (Müller, 2009, p.38). . 
 
In the current emissions trading system, the smallest ¾ of all installations account for 
only 5.1% of the total verified emissions whereas the biggest 1.8% of all installations 
represent half of the emissions within the EU ETS (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, 
p.19). These small installations are connected with excessive transaction costs 
compared to their reduction potential. Therefore, in the new proposal it is intended 
that installations with a thermal capacity of 20 to 25 MW, emitting less than 10,000 
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tonnes of CO2 per year, can be excluded from the EU ETS if other emission 
reduction measures are applied (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, p.22).  
 
Because the EU ETS is limited to certain sectors, marginal abatement costs are only 
equalised in a subtotal part of the economy. In turn the trading system misses its goal 
of minimising overall compliance costs. Therefore, economists think about expanding 
the emissions trading system to further sectors. From 2012 on, aviation is included in 
the trading system, and further industrial sectors are likely to follow. Furthermore, 
during the first two periods, only CO2 was covered in the emissions trading system. 
With the start of the third period the trading system will also cover the other five Kyoto 
gases. 
 
Not only will the design of the trading system change, the infrastructure will also face 
alterations. In 2013, a common Community registry will start, and the efficiency, 
transparency, and security of the trading system will be improved.  
 
 
5.4. Does the theory work? 
 
As described in chapter 4.1.1, the commitment to maximal values for environmental 
pollution is a political process which can lead to suboptimal solutions. In the case of 
the EU ETS, most countries feared that a very stringent enforcement of the 
emissions trading directive would harm their economies (see chapter 6.1). Thus, they 
allocated their certificates very loosely. This over-allocation resulted in a price drop of 
emission allowances (accurately described in chapter 6.2), which seriously 
endangered the functionality of the trading system.  
 
Because of this unfair process, the trading system could not profit from its great 
theoretical advantages. The attribute of economic efficiency, best shown in the 
example in chapter 4.2.1.1, depends on certain assumptions that were not fulfilled 
during the first trading period. Furthermore, the extensive allocation and the low 
certificate price endangered the ecological effectiveness of the trading system 
(described in chapter 4.2.2). 
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On the other hand, the gentle transition in Europe from a situation without any 
emission restrictions to an emissions trading system smartly solved the problem of 
regulative compliance (see chapter 4.2.3).   
 
Other challenges than the extensive allocation of certificates did not gain much 
attention. Because of the low certificate price, transaction and administration costs, 
outlined in chapter 4.2.1.4, did not considerably matter. Furthermore, the stock 
markets functioned well and now market participants already have substantial 
knowledge about the trading process. Fears in connection with the Clean 
Development Mechanism (chapter 6.7) and carbon leakage (chapter 6.9) also did not 
turn into reality because of the low price of emission permits but could become more 
important in the second and third trading period.  
 
 
6. Issues and challenges  
 
Chapter 4 accurately explains the theoretical functionality of a tradable permits 
solution. Of course, the great theoretical advantages like cost-efficiency were major 
reasons for the European Commission to propose the introduction of the EU ETS in 
the first place. The design of the trading system was influenced by various interests 
of the European Commission, member states and industrial lobbying groups. 
Therefore, the trading system did not have the optimal preconditions it would have 
needed to reach its full potential. The upcoming chapter addresses current issues 
and challenges and points out possible solutions to improve the emissions trading 
system in future periods.  
 
 
6.1. The design of National Allocation Plans 
 
The National Allocation Plans contain the distribution of the national emission 
budgets among the individual sectors participating or not participating in the 
European emissions trading system as well as the criteria for the allocation of the 
certificates among the facilities themselves.  
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In the legal system of the European Union, directives do not work effectuate but have 
to be transformed into national law by the individual member states. Therefore, 
important decision-making authorities remain at national levels. In the first and 
second trading period, the total quantity of emissions covered by the EU ETS has not 
been regulated by one single European authority but by the individual member 
states. This decentralised approach can be explained with the help of the subsidiary 
principle, the heterogeneous structure of the European industry, and the different 
commitments under the Burden Sharing Agreement (Müller, 2009, p.24).  
 
The construction of an emissions trading scheme of this great size requires 
enormous organisational and administrative efforts. After all, twenty-five national 
governments are included in the process. Furthermore, the European wide regulation 
is complicated by the fact that within the European Union various sectors face 
competition to different degrees.  
 
Unfortunately, the decentralised system has created a tendency towards low 
environmental ambitions. Chapter 4.1.1 explains that the total emissions volume 
depends not only on efficiency but also on other factors, for example political 
feasibility. In the case of the EU ETS, no country wants to disadvantage its economy. 
Therefore, a strong incentive for extensive allocation of certificates has appeared. 
Lobbying groups and economic stakeholders have also influenced political decision-
makers to design the NAPs to their advantage (Müller, 2008, p.39).  
 
The extensive allocation of permits requires large emission reductions in sectors 
outside the EU ETS that are likely to come along with higher marginal abatement 
costs. On the other hand, the moderate reduction targets and the system of 
grandfathering created a soft transition for the European industry sectors to the 
emissions trading system in the first trading period.   
 
During the development of the National Allocation Plans, some difficulties occurred. 
The allocation of the certificates is a fundamental aspect of the trading system; the 
challenge is to find and establish a proper allocation formula. At the beginning of the 
second trading period, the Commission had to strongly interfere with the definition of 
the national caps and the allocation process due to pronounced long positions in 
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many countries and sectors during the pilot phase (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, 
p.22). Sometimes the allocated quantities even exceeded the estimated emissions. 
This excessive allocation of permits endangered the Kyoto targets.  
 
No member state took the Kyoto basic years as reference years. The official 
explanation was insufficient data, but the hidden agenda was probably the fact that 
emissions sharply increased during the 1990s. Because the reference years vary 
among member states international comparability is very hard. Some member states 
also intended to ex-post adjust their allocation which would disrupt the market 
mechanism and create uncertainties for companies. Furthermore, there were 
difficulties with the interpretation of the term “facility” that also led to extensive 
certificates allocation (Stix, 2007, p.29).  
 
The Cap and Trade system is usually regarded as an especially cost-efficient 
instrument, but in this context, important connections to reality are often overseen. 
Economists usually assume a perfectly functioning certificates market and 
underestimate costs for the establishment and maintenance of such markets.  
 
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland claimed at the 
court that the stringent cuts of their second NAPs would damage their economic 
development (Müller, 2008, p.44). If the court rules in favour for them, this will be a 
strong backlash for the EU ETS. 
 
 
6.2. Price development and the over-allocation of certificates 
 
As described in chapter 6.1, the decentralised approach to let member states decide 
individually about important parameters like the emission caps and the allocation 
formulas led to low environmental ambitiousness and an over-allocation of emission 
certificates. This overall long position resulted in significant price drops in 2006 and 
2007 down to a few cents per certificate which endangered the functionality of the 
trading system during the first trading period.  
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6.2.1 Factors affecting the certificates market 
 
The CO2 market is influenced by several different parameters. One major factor and, 
therefore, one of the most important market drivers is the design of the National 
Allocation Plans. The stepwise stringency of the allocated allowances is of crucial 
importance for the trading system to work and for reasonable prices to develop.  
 
Another important factor for the development of the certificates price is the linking of 
the trading system with the Kyoto mechanisms, namely Joint Implementation and the 
Clean Development Mechanism. The conjunction enhances liquidity and smoothes 
the price development.  
 
Weather circumstances have a dual impact on the production of CO2. Hot summers 
impact the demand for energy because of increased use of air conditioning. On the 
other hand, they reduce the output of hydroelectric power plants. Cold winters, on the 
contrary, increase the demand for heating (Müller, 2009, p.29). At low temperatures, 
the consumption of energy rises. In turn, this means an increase in the demand for 
CO2 in electricity and energy facilities increases too. Furthermore, rainfall and wind 
velocity influence the share of renewable energy which in turn influences the CO2 
price level.  
 
CO2 production is also affected by differences in fuel prices. If the price for carbon or 
gas changes, an alteration of the utilisation is likely and this changes the quantity of 
emitted CO2. Especially the significant price increase in import coal has caused gas 
to become comparatively cheap up until now (Draxler, 2008, p.117).  
 
Another important factor for the demand of carbon dioxide is economic growth. This 
relationship is described in the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) that implies a 
connection between the economic performance (GNP per capita) and the degree of 
environmental damage. Generally, a converse U-shaped interrelation is assumed, 
meaning that emissions rise with economic growth until a certain economic standard 
has been reached and then decline again (Stix, 2007, p.33-34). In the light of this, 
especially the high economic growth of emerging markets like China and India, which 
 58 
have never agreed to any pollution restrictions, could foil the emission reductions of 
industrialised nations and, therefore, endanger the global climate.      
 
If technological progress leads to new and cheaper possibilities to abate CO2, the 
demand for EUAs will decline. Of course, this is a very slow process; sudden 
technological improvements that lead to strong price shifts are not to be expected. 
Besides all these factors, speculators cause further movements on the allowances 
market. 
 
 
6.2.2 Over-allocation of emission certificates 
 
From 2005 to 2007, EUAs for 2,090 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents were allocated 
on average each year. In comparison only 2.040 million tonnes were verified. This 
means that the emissions market was long with 70 million tonnes per year21, which 
corresponds to 3.4% of the allocated allowances. During these years, only 5 out of 
24 member states22 were in a short position, all other countries were in a long 
position (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, p.14). 
 
This overall long position implies very low carbon prices or even prices close to zero. 
Unfortunately, a positive price on carbon is one of the main prerequisites for the 
system to render the intended effect of transforming the European energy system. 
Hence, the continuing long position poses a serious threat to the effectiveness of the 
trading scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The emissions market is in a long position when the sellers of permits generally produce less CO2 than 
permitted. On the other hand, a market is in a short position when market participants pollute more tonnes of 
CO2 compared to the number of permits allocated. 
22 UK, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Slovenia 
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6.2.3 The development of the certificates price 
 
Figure 6.123 shows the price development and the traded volume of EU Allowances 
on the European Energy Exchange in Leipzig, Germany. During 2005 and the first 
quarter of 2006, allowance prices were constantly strong. Traders feared a shortage 
of certificates and in April 2006 the price reached a maximum of EUR 30.5 per ton of 
CO2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Price development and traded volume of EUA certificates on the European Energy Exchange 
 
 
At the end of April, the service provider Point Carbon announced that the French 
industry would emit 12% less CO2 in 2005 compared to the allocated certificates. 
Therefore, 18 million more certificates than expected were available (Draxler, 2008, 
p.113). When the market participants realised that the market was in an overall long 
position, the price of CO2 certificates collapsed dramatically. Other countries also had 
a surplus of CO2 permits. As a result, the price of CO2 certificates bisected and 
almost reached zero at the end of the first trading period in 2007. 
 
                                                 
23http://www.eex.com/de/Marktdaten/Handelsdaten/Emissionsrechte/EU%20Emission%20Allowances
%0|%20Spotmarkt/EU%20Emission%20Allowances%20Chart%20|%20Spotmarkt/spot-eua-
chart/2010-05-14/0/0/a, downloaded on June 29, 2010 
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For the second trading period, the Commission cut emission allowances by about 
10% to re-establish a viable price for CO2. So far, this measure has led to a 
stabilization of allowance prices. Analysts now expect a price of about EUR 23 for 
one ton CO2 (Müller, 2008, p.41).  
 
 
6.3. Regional phenomena 
 
Between 1990 and 2006, the EU 15 managed a greenhouse gas reduction of -2.2% 
(EU 27: -7.7%) (Müller, 2008, p.35-36). Unfortunately, this moderate reduction was 
mainly caused by two single and non-repeatable effects of the two greatest European 
emitters Germany and the United Kingdom. 
 
Germany benefited from the reunion with the former German Democratic Republic 
that faced a breakdown of its industry because of the economic transformation in the 
1990s (Ziesing, 2009, p.105). Therefore, the German greenhouse gas emissions 
declined without any additional effort and it was very easy for Germany to reach its 
ambitious reduction target. This phenomenon is called the “Berlin Wall” effect.  
 
The UK, on the other hand, profited from the liberalisation of its energy market that 
caused a combustible change from oil and coal towards gas (Müller, 2008, p.38). 
Because of these phenomena and the domination of Germany and UK in the 
European emissions market, the European Union as a whole is on a good way to 
reach its Kyoto target. Of course, these two effects can not be repeated. Therefore 
further efforts will be necessary to continuously reduce pollution and comply with 
international agreements.  
 
The new member states of the European Union faced a similar effect like Germany 
after the reunion with the former German Democratic Republic. Most Eastern 
European countries are over-endowed with AAUs due to the economic recession and 
the collapse of the heavy industry and mining sector in the 1990s. Thus, their Kyoto 
target (-6.0% or -8.0%) is above their expected emissions for 2012 (Weirig, 2005, 
p.33). These excess Kyoto allowances are called “hot air”. Because “hot air” can be 
sold in large amounts on the international market, the price declines and destabilises 
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the permits market. The trading of “hot air” was one of the major reasons why the 
supplementarity clause was introduced into the Kyoto Protocol, stating that domestic 
emission reduction efforts should have first priority and the flexible mechanisms 
should only be supplementary. 
 
 
6.4. Auctioning versus grandfathering 
 
During the first two trading periods, the emissions trading directive has prescribed 
that to a large extent the allocation of certificates has had to be free of charge. This 
regulation has been crucial in the political process to resolve the resistance of the 
energy-intensive industry.  
 
In the case of free allocation as well as in the case of auctioning, an aggregated plan 
is necessary to define the upper limit of emission certificates and, therefore, to 
substantially determine the ecological effectiveness of the trading system. By using 
grandfathering (that is allocating certificates according to historical emissions), 
additionally to the macro plan, a complete micro plan is needed for the allocation 
among facilities. Therefore, very high administrative costs are created. Furthermore, 
the system leads to a preferential treatment of individual facilities very easily and, 
therefore, to distortion of competition.  
 
Of course, administrative costs also appear when certificates are auctioned. They 
include development costs of the auction design, costs for the construction of the 
required infrastructure and continuous administrative costs for the operation (Müller, 
2009, p.37). Furthermore, market participants face costs which strongly depend on 
the number of auctions as well as on the auction design.  
 
Regarding the efficiency of the trading system (described in chapter 4), the 
equivalence of auctioning and cost-free allocation depends on the ability of the 
companies to integrate the opportunity costs of gratis certificates into their 
management decisions. If a company has to purchase CO2 certificates by auction, its 
variable costs (more precisely its marginal production costs) increase. On the other 
hand, these costs also have to be considered in the case of cost-free allocation 
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because the emission of one ton of CO2 annihilates the possibility to sell the 
certificate on the market. It can be argued that auctioning certificates leads to an 
actual increase in production costs because companies do not always maximise their 
profit in due consideration of the opportunity costs.  
 
Furthermore, less grandfathering and more auctioning would reduce some of the 
main market uncertainties, create less volatile prices, provide for reliable price signals 
on the market, and probably reduce administrative costs. Because the opportunity 
costs of CO2 certificates are already included in the market prices, increased 
auctioning is not likely to increase energy prices. Furthermore, the problem of how to 
deal with new entrants into the emissions trading system is solved automatically. 
Additionally, by auctioning the certificates instead of allocating them cost-free, the 
extra profits of the companies would become public revenues and could, therefore be 
used meaningfully, inter alia for further emission reduction activities.  
 
As described in chapter 5.3.2, auctioning will become the standard allocation method 
in future trading periods.  
 
 
6.5. Windfall profits 
 
As mentioned in chapter 6.4, in the first trading period, the allocation of emission 
licences among companies was generally free of charge. Companies, especially in 
the energy intensive industry, recorded these gratis licences as opportunity costs at 
fair market value. Therefore, these opportunity costs were passed on to the electricity 
tariffs and the companies realised profits in the billions (Brouns, Witt, 2008, p.75). 
Subsequently, indirectly existing market structures were strengthened and the 
ecological steering effects that were meant to create incentives for new investments 
were undermined.  
 
Passing on additional costs caused by the emission trading system depends on three 
factors (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, p.28). Firstly, sectors with a relatively low 
elasticity of demand are able to raise the prices of their products (without inducing 
strong reductions in demand). Secondly, low competition within the market also 
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increases the extent to which prices can be raised as a reaction to increased input 
costs. Finally, the geography of the sector’s market matters because the 
competitiveness of European companies could be influenced by companies outside 
the EU that do not face emission constraints. The same distortions can also appear 
due to different approaches of the member states regarding the stringency of their 
NAPs, since also in this situation sectors in different EU countries are exposed to 
negative effects to different extents.  
 
The empirical evidence so far suggests that windfall profits happen but they vary 
considerably across countries and sectors. It depends on a number of factors which 
determine the industry structure and competition within the market if companies can 
easily price in certificate costs to consumer prices. The highest windfall profits are 
generated by the electricity sector (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, p.27). 
 
 
6.6. The prohibition of emissions banking between periods 
 
As described in chapter 5.2.4, banking of emission permits was not possible between 
the first and the second trading period. Hence, the decision horizon was reduced 
significantly, which contributed to the high volatility of CO2 prices. 
 
Emissions banking has several positive consequences. It reduces the overall 
enforcement costs because of inter-temporal flexibility and makes it possible for 
companies to create a safety buffer of certificates. Therefore, companies are able to 
manage abatement efforts more efficiently which in turn leads to increased efficiency 
Banking also creates better price signals on the market.  
 
An explanation why member states tend to prohibit certificates banking between 
periods is that the Kyoto targets have only been in effect since 2008. If many 
allowances were assigned into this period, single member states could miss their 
reduction targets. 
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6.7. Clean Development Mechanism and the threat of abuse 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism is designed to promote projects in third world 
countries that contribute to climate protection. Since climate change is a global 
problem and it makes no difference where on earth emission reductions are 
accomplished, it is generally reasonable to reduce pollution in developing countries 
because environmental protection activities are usually much cheaper in these 
countries than in industrialised nations24.  
 
The connection of the EU ETS with the flexible instruments JI and CDM follows the 
same line of argumentation. Technological transfer, the sustainable development of 
host countries, the advancement of liquidity of the trading system, and increased 
quantity and diversity of possible options for compliance are only some of many 
important advantages (Sterk, Arens, 2008, p.43). Bottom line, the linking between the 
flexible Kyoto instruments and the EU ETS lowers the allowance price and, therefore, 
reduces compliance costs for the member states as well as for the facilities that 
participate in the Emissions Trading System.  
 
Despite these arguments, it was one of the most important goals of European 
delegates during the Kyoto negotiations that domestic actions have to be prioritised 
over the purchase of certificates from abroad. After all, the main target of the protocol 
is a change in domestic pollution behaviour and the start of a long-term 
transformation of the energy infrastructure towards sustainable energy sources. 
Furthermore, domestic actions also bring along various beneficial side-effects like 
enhanced security of the energy supply and reduced air pollution through exhausts. 
Greater use of the flexible Kyoto mechanisms, thus, reduces the costs of compliance 
with the EU ETS in the short run but also bears the risk that domestic reduction 
activities are not enforced. By extensive use of the flexible instruments, short-dated 
commercial profit-maximisation and long-term economic efficiency come into conflict. 
 
Meanwhile it seems that the European Union has abandoned its goal of prioritising 
domestic actions. The quantity of JI and CDM credits permitted in the EU ETS is 
almost identical with the necessary reduction quantity in Europe although the 
                                                 
24 During the first trading period, credits gained with the help of the flexible instruments JI and CDM were 
hardly used because of the very low certificate price.  
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Commission has significantly reduced the number of certificates allocated by the 
member states in the second trading period. Therefore, most member states are 
expected to meet their Kyoto targets not because of domestic reduction activities but 
only because of the acquisition of certificates (Sterk, Arens, 2008, p.37).  
 
Besides, the utilisation of JI and CDM faces further structural problems that 
undermine their ecological value as well as their contribution to the development of 
third world countries. The projects’ crediting process is double-bounded. Firstly, the 
member states have to specify in their National Allocation Plans to what extent they 
are planning to use the flexible mechanisms in order to comply with their Kyoto 
targets. Secondly, facility operators can use CERs and ERUs to a certain 
percentage. This regulation requires the coordination of public and private purchases 
of certificates and, therefore, high transaction and information costs as well as a 
highly developed communication infrastructure. 
 
For the verification of additionality of CDM projects, the difference between the 
baseline (the expected development of emissions in absence of the specific CDM 
project) and the quantity of actual greenhouse gas emissions is calculated. Of 
course, the reference scenario is entirely based on estimations. Therefore, it is only a 
hypothesis, not a hard empirical fact. Hence, the estimated scenario as well as the 
certificate of additionality will always be assailable. In the past, many ominous 
projects have stoked the suspicion of abusive practices (Witt, Moritz, 2008, p.91).  
 
The major weakness of the CDM verification process is that all involved participants 
(investors, validators, host- as well as investing countries) have the same interest 
which is to maximise the certificates generated from the project at the least costs 
possible. This situation leads to a great abusive potential. A key element in this 
process is the missing independence of the validators who have the responsibility to 
guarantee the proper course and the projects’ additionality. Validating companies, 
also called Designated Operational Entities, are accredited by the CDM executive 
council of the United Nations, but they are appointed by the project executing 
organisations. Because these companies are often dependent on subsequent 
appointments, they are under great pressure to grant positive notifications. Of course, 
CDM projects without additionality lead to a global increase of greenhouse gas 
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emissions. The climate protection targets of the Kyoto Protocol as well as the 
European Emissions Trading system would, therefore, be reduced to absurdity.  
 
CDM activities also face the criticism that, in reality, they hardly contribute to 
technological transfer and the sustainable development of third world countries. Only 
little capital is spent for efficiency improvements and renewable energy. Furthermore, 
there are hardly any CDM projects in Africa. In addition, many CDM projects are 
accompanied by negative ecological and social side effects (Witt, Moritz, 2008, 
p.102). Moreover, the Kyoto instrument can create incentives to produce climate 
killers like fluoroform (CHF3) that has a global warming potential of about 15,000 CO2 
equivalents, so that they can subsequently be decontaminated profitably by earning 
CDM credits (Brunnengräber, 2008, p.142).     
 
Bottom line, the implementation of reasonable quality standards would naturally limit 
the number of generated certificates. Therefore, the certificate price would increase. 
Subsequently also high-valued projects (e.g. renewable energy projects) would 
become financially attractive.  
 
 
6.8. The possibility of connecting emissions trading systems 
 
The connection of the EU ETS with other emissions trading systems in industrialised 
countries, called the linking process, has several advantages. From an economic 
perspective, a greater market creates cheaper and more efficient possibilities for 
abatement. Furthermore, the price development could be smoothed. From the 
international perspective, a connected market and the development of emissions 
trading systems in various countries could be an important impulse for the 
advancement of the international climate protection policy for the time beyond 2012 
(Schüle, Sterk, Duckat, 2008, p.178). Of course, geographically expanding the 
European Emissions Trading System only addresses cost-efficiency but not the total 
quantity of global emissions.  
 
The EU ETS is potentially open to link agreements with other emissions trading 
systems. The best example for the success of the linking process is Norway which 
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created its own emissions trading system which was connected to the EU ETS in 
2008. Other industrialised countries like Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand discuss the implementation of comparable systems or already maintain 
trading systems (Schüle, Sterk, Duckat, 2008, p.178-180). On the intra-national level 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative should be mentioned that is implemented in 
ten eastern and north-eastern US states. In 2007 the International Carbon Action 
Partnership (ICAP) was launched. It is a forum with stakeholders of over 25 countries 
that aims to support the linkage between the EU ETS and other compatible trading 
systems.  
 
Of course, considerable differences in the design of the various emissions trading 
systems can not be neglected. Therefore, the connection between the EU ETS and 
other trading systems could go hand in hand with complex problems.  
 
 
6.9. Global climate protection and carbon leakage 
 
The Kyoto Protocol distinguishes between industrialised and developing countries. 
Only industrialised countries are obliged to constrain their greenhouse gas 
emissions, the developing countries have no targets whatsoever. The basic idea 
behind this regulation is the costs-by-cause principle, saying that the industrialised 
countries are responsible for global warming in the first place; poorer countries, on 
the other hand, should have a right to develop. However, it must be noted that 
greenhouse gas pollution is a pure collective good. Climate change is a global 
problem and that it does not matter where pollution takes place. Since some of the 
world’s largest and fastest growing emitters25 continue to increase their greenhouse 
gas emissions, the reduction efforts done by the European Union are likely to be 
outweighed by the increasing pollution in other parts of the world. 
 
In developing countries and emerging markets (non-Annex-I countries), greenhouse 
gas emissions are increasing especially fast26. In 2007 they were more than doubled 
                                                 
25 China and India are developing countries and are therefore not committed to any emission reductions. 
Furthermore, some industrialised countries like the United States have not signed the protocol and, therefore, do 
not participate in climate protection.  
26 This phenomenon can be explained by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (see chapter 6.2.1) 
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compared to 1990. For the first time, emissions in these countries exceeded the 
emissions in the rest of the world (Ziesing, 2009, p.102). Of course, the emissions 
per capita in non-Annex-I countries were only one fourth of the per capita emissions 
in industrialized nations (Ziesing, 2009, p.102-103).  
 
Companies in countries with stringent reduction regulations have a competitive 
disadvantage compared to companies that are located in countries without reduction 
targets. Either costs rise because of investments in carbon abatement activities or 
because of purchases of emission certificates. In addition, indirect costs can occur 
because of higher electricity prices that are passed on by electricity producers. Thus, 
it becomes interesting for domestic companies to relocate carbon or energy intensive 
industries to countries without CO2 regulations (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, 
p.26). This phenomenon is called “carbon leakage” and is one of the most striking 
arguments against emission reduction policies. Of course, if future investments in the 
concerned sectors happen more often in developing countries, carbon leakage does 
not only result in lower employment and growth rates in Europe but also undermines 
the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS. 
 
The negative competitiveness caused by the EU ETS can be reduced in two different 
ways. Firstly, alleviation measures change the incentive structure of the scheme and 
the functioning of the market. They include the recycling of revenues generated from 
auctioning, the limitation of allowance prices, for example by higher proportions of JI 
and CDM credits, and an allocation system based on benchmarks. Compensation 
measures, on the other hand, include tax breaks, reduction of burdens, government 
subsidies and the redistribution of “windfall taxes” (Köppl, Thenius, Schleicher, 2008, 
p.32). Furthermore, while in the short to medium term environmental regulations 
usually have negative impact on the regulated industries due to compliance costs, 
industries can benefit from first mover advantages in the longer term. 
 
Most studies conclude that carbon leakage is generally a minor threat and only 
limited to some industrial sectors. However, the effects strongly depend on the proper 
implementation of the trading system. A weak or inconsistent implementation raises 
the threat level to the competitiveness of the European industry (Köppl, Thenius, 
Schleicher, 2008, p.31).  
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To sum up, it can be said that as long as there is no worldwide cooperation in climate 
protection, the EU ETS is an ecologically inefficient system. Only if all big polluters 
participate in climate protection, emissions trading will become an effective tool to 
combat global warming. Therefore, a sustainable solution depends on the question if 
the United States, together with China the word’s greatest emitter, will commit to 
precise emissions reduction targets and if the less developed countries, especially 
China and India, whose emissions are growing rapidly, will accede to pollution 
boundaries.  
 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 
The European Emissions Trading System, established in 2005, is the most important 
and most innovative policy tool that the European Union uses to comply with its 
Kyoto targets. Tradable permits are generally judged very positively in economic 
literature, but first experiences show that the devil is in the details. The most 
significant issue during the first trading period of the EU ETS was the collapse of the 
certificates price down to a few cents in 2007.  
 
This price drop was a result of the extensive over-allocation of certificates in many 
European member states. Europe hardly had any experience with tradable permits 
for environmental protection, and no country wanted to disadvantage its economy. 
Therefore, the incentive was very high to loosely allocate certificates free of charge. 
The decentralised approach to let the member states decide on fundamental aspects 
like the total quantity of certificates and the allocation formulas turned out to be 
ineligible and seriously endangered the functionality of the trading system. On the 
other hand, implementing these regulations was probably the only way to break the 
resistance of industrial lobbying groups.   
 
The trading system also faced various other problems. Companies earned billions by 
pricing in their gratis certificates in consumer prices. Furthermore, the Clean 
Development Mechanism was an easy target for abusive behaviour. In spite of these 
challenges, it has to be mentioned that climate policy in the European Union is a 
continuous learning process. Considering the improvements from the first to the 
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second period and the promising alterations that are planned for the third trading 
period, the future prospects of the European Emissions Trading System are not so 
dismal after all. 
 
Since the EU ETS is unique in its size and internationality, it is understandable that 
some start up time is needed. Now, European policy makers are facing the challenge 
to centralise the decision-making process, to ensure reasonable and restrictive cuts 
and to introduce a fair allocation method. The alterations that are planned for the 
third trading period already fulfil most of the requirements mentioned above. 
 
Unfortunately, even if climate protection in Europe worked perfectly, it would not have 
any mentionable effect on global warming whatsoever. Only if all significant polluters 
worldwide commit to greenhouse gas reduction and limitation obligations, climate 
protection can be seriously approached. Of course, an efficiently functioning trading 
system in Europe would be a brilliant argument for environmental protection 
proponents and a great motivation for unwilling actors to reconsider their point of 
view.  
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